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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., 
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Defendants. 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I, Michael E. Kelly, having been first duly sworn upon oath, do hereby depose and state under 
penalty of perjury: 
I. That I am one of the attorneys for Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals in the 
above-captioned case and make this Affidavit of my own personal knowledge; 
2. That attached as Exhibit A to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of pp. 37-44 and Exhibits 
C & E of the transcript of the deposition of Wade Massey, dated 05117/11. 
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APPRAISALS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-I 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this 2:.3_ day of January, 2012. 
Michael E. Kelly 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me a notary public this 2~y of January, 2012. 
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M y Commission Expires:_--=~t:;F---t--\:b''--
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APPRAISALS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-2 
01.69 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 0_ day of January, 2012, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated 
below, addressed as follows: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
WILSON & MCCOLL 
420 W. Washington 
PO Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-9100 
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Patrick J. Collins 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
700 17th St., Suite 1820 
Denver, CO 80202 
Telephone: (303) 296-7700 
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160 
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specific other than "Therf t of mistakes." 1 
I thi1Lk the one that he ~id mention was 2 
that it was Parma, it says Parma versus Caldwell. 3 
But that was probably what set him to make the 4 
~ll. 5 
Q. Back to page 11 in Exhibit B, and I'm 6 
in the column of "Comparable No. 4." It's 3703 7 
N. Highway 16. 8 
A. Um-hmm. 9 
Q. About ten iines down under the row for 10 
"c~'-e" '-h0~0'~ an a,.:i~,,~,_.,,,.,,,.,..,._ ,..r 4° son no Yv"11 11 U1l l \.t!.\.t l) ..l U.JUi:>Ll.1-1\,..d .. U .. VJ.. - ./' v. ,_ -
see that? 12 
A.Ida. 13 
Q. And the site was 10 acres, just to the 14 
left of that. What does the 49,800 represent? 15 
A. If these numbers are correct, which I 16 
don't know if they are, that would be a 17 
$10,000-an-acre adjustment. 18 
Q. And why would you make that adjustme W 
A. Because the 10 acres is larger than the 20 
subject of 5.02. So since it's superior, you 21 
would take away $49,800, based on a 22 
$10,000-an-acre adjustment for contributory val 
when comparing the two. 24 
Q. And is that to bring the 
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contributo ue of 10 grand an acre. 
V rnu 1-nr>•XT CllnPr1r>r 111" r>n a h1"ll nr1th 
.L '-J' ..l.lt...L..l.'-J Vv' U\..J..t-'V..l...LV.L' L-&.l-1 V.J..J.. .l...L -L...L VV .LLLI. 
360-degree views is as close as I could see to 
becoming an equal comparable valuewise, if that 
makes sense, in Caldwell. 
Q. Okay, we're going to move on. 
Mr. Massey, I hand you what has been 
marked as Deposition Exhibit C. Can you identify 
that? 
A. This is a check written to my company 
from Idahy Federal Credit Union. 
Q. Do you know what it was for? 
A. I do now. I didn't at that time. 
Evidently, I'm told it was meant to pay for this 
appraisal. 
Q. And Capitol West negotiated the check? 
A. Can you describe the word "negotiated"? 
Q. Cashed, deposited the check in its bank 
account. 
A. My sister, who is an independent 
contractor for me, did, yes. 
Q. And is she the one who put the stamp on 
the back of the check and deposited that? 
A. Yes. 
Page 40 
1 A. You're trying to make them apples to 1 A. Shannon Polfer, P-o-1-f-e-r. And 
2 apples, yes. 2 actually -- no, yeah, she did. It was her. I 
3 Q. And so an adjustment to bring the 3 had another employee that worked for me around 
4 acreages very close in size? 4 this time that did my books, but she left. It is 
5 A. Well, yes. You're trying to take away 5 my sister that did deposit this. 
6 monetary value to make it smaller. 6 Q. I'm going to hand you what has been 
7 Q. Do you know the physical layout of 7 marked as Exhibit D. I'll ask if you can 
8 comparable property No. 4, a comparable sale? 8 identify this? 
9 A. Meaning, the lay of the land? 9 A. It looks like the boundaries that were 
10 Q. The lay of the land, yeah. What would 10 described in this defective report describing the 
11 cause those extra 5 acres to be worth only 11 neighborhood boundaries for the subject prope1iy, 
12 $10,000 an acre? 12 which is incorrect. 
13 A. I don't know the lay of the land, as we 13 Q. Okay. I drew that, and that's what I 
14 sit here. Again, if those numbers were -- my 14 intended it to represent, so thank you. 
15 intention, which I don't know if they were, if 15 A. Um-hmm. 
16 they were -- excess land in Eagle, if that was in 16 Q. Mr. Massey, I hand you what has been 
17 Eagle, also had a contributory value of $10,000 17 marked as Deposition Exhibit E, and ask if you 
18 an acre, which is high -- it's considered on the 18 can identify that? 
19 high side -- for adjustment value in this area. 19 A. I've never seen this document before in 
20 Since I saw Valerie Hruza's 5 acres as 20 my life. 
21 superior to its immediate surroundings because i 1 Q. What does it appear to be? 
22 was up on a hill, that was my justification for 22 A. It appears to be a Settlement -- I'm 
23 -- or would have been my justification, in my 23 guessing for the -- no, I don't know. Is this 
24 mind, for using an Eagle property that -- you 24 the loan that she got -- or I mean the Settlement 
25 know, flat land in Eagle is valued with a 25 Statement for the loan that Ms. Hruza got from 

























Idahy? I don't know. 1 
Q. Who's the borrower over in the upper 2 
left-hand comer there? 3 
A. Valerie Hruza. 4 
Q. And the identity of the lender? 5 
A. Idahy Federal Credit Union. 6 
Q. And the property location? 7 
A. 16462 Plum Road, in Caldwell. 8 
Q. And that's the subject property? 9 
A. I believe it is. 10 
Q. Yeah, that we've been talking about? 11 
A. Yes. Itlookslikeitis. 12 
Q. And then what's the settlement date? 13 
A. 9/13/07. 14 
Q. And that is approximately how long 15 
after the effective date of your appraisal? 16 
A. Roughly three months, I believe. 17 
Q. And approximately how long after the 18 
date you signed the appraisal? 19 
A. Eight months, I think. Well, I would 20 
have signed it the day I sent it. But, again, 21 
that particular field is a dynamic field. So I 22 
don't know if that's even the correct date it was 23 
signed, because that is one of the dynamic fields 24 
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where, if you look at the 
intersection of Homedale Road and Plum Road, I 
believe it was south of, but I don't recall. 
Q. And if you could refer back to 
Exhibit D, that's the -- the boundaries of the 
neighborhood is described in the report? 
A. Exhibit D is, yes. I believe that 
outlines the incorrect boundaries. 
Q. Right. Could you reproduce that on 
Exhibit F? 
A. Circling it? 
Q. Or draw it kind of in the shape it is. 
A. (Witness complied.) Okay. 
Q. I'm going to hand you now what has been 
marked as Exhibit G. Can you identify Exhibit G 
A. This looks like a copy of Scope of Work 
for the appraisal. 
Q. And the "CWA" number up on the top? 
A. 1932. 
Q. Does that confirm it's the scope of 
work for this? 
A. I believe it is, yeah. 
Q. Do you recognize whose writing it is 
that appears on Exhibit G? 
Page 44 
1 it throws arbitrary numbers in there. 1 Q. Do you recognize whose signature that 
2 Q. Let's look at Exhibit B again, and see 2 is? 
3 what it says on the date that you signed it. 3 A. No. 
4 A. It says July 20, 2007. So if that 4 Q. What date appears? 
5 number was correct it would be within two months 5 A. 9/13/07. 
6 Q. I direct your attention to under 6 Q. How does that date compare to the date 
7 "Settlement Charges" about the fourth line down, 7 on Exhibit E? 
8 No. 803, "Appraisal fee"? 8 A. How? Oh, I believe that was the 
9 A. Okay. 9 settlement date. 
10 Q. "Capitol West, $800"? 10 Q. Which is the settlement statement, 
11 A. Okay. 11 yeah. 
12 Q. Is that represented by Exhibit C, which 12 A. Okay, yeah. I believe that was the 
13 was the check? 13 settlement date shown in that. 
14 A. I would say the numbers match. What 14 Q. And the two dates match? 
15 their intention was, I don't know, but I'm 15 A. They do appear to match. Can I ask 
16 assummg. 16 you, what does that say? To me it's not legible. 
17 Q. Mr. Massey, I hand you what has been 17 Do you know? 
18 marked as Exhibit F. What I'd like you to do on 18 Q. I'll tell you what I think it is just 
19 this, if you could, is mark approximately where 19 to help you with your interpretation. "Okay to 
20 the subject property is on this exhibit. 20 use appraisal one time." 
21 A. Here's Plum Road, I can see that. I 21 A. Who is that signature? 
22 don't recall if it's south of Homedale Road or 22 Q. I don't know. That's why I was asking 
23 north ofHomedaJe Road. 23 you. 
24 Q. But it's in the neighborhood? 24 A. Oh, you know it might be -- I think 
25 A. I'm guessing. I'm going to circle 25 it's the vice president. 





CAPITOL WEST APPRAISALS 
AW~EMASSEY 
POBOX1~ 
BOISE lO 83710 




°*• 5- lt · \\ 





https: //primelink.temgweb.com/ocapp?ex=ManipulateSelectedltem.do Viewimage%26pin.. . 8/17120 IO 
0001.74 
Settlement Statet 'ent 
Optional Form for 
Transactions without Sellers 
Name & Address of Borrower: 
VALARlE HRUZA 
16462 PLUM RO 
CALDWELL, 10 83607 
Property Loca rion (it di erent from above): 
16462 PLUM RO 
CALDWELL, ID 83607 
Loan Number: 
001 
U.S. Dep1utmant of Housl1. .. 
and Urba11 Devcf1.1(11t'1(Jnt 
.. .,) 
Name & Address of lender : 
I DAHY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION 
1 010 ROSE STREET 
BOISE, ID 83703-5739 
ettlernent Agent: 
DAN BA~GER 
Place of Settlement: 
. l'\111 ' ... u I' O"UV CT"ll 
Settlement Date: 
9/13/2007 
OMS Aµprovul No. 2602·0491 
L. Settlement Charges (Items marked "P.O.C ." were paid outsidfr closin g.) M. Disbursement to Others 
800. Items Payable in Connection with loan 
801. Loan origination fee % to $ 
802. l oan discoum % to " 
803. Appraisal tee to CAPITOL WEST APPRAISALS "aoo.oo 
804. Credit report. to " 
805 . Inspection tee to .... 
806. Mortgaoe insurance application fee to "' 
807. Mortgage broker fee to ;; 
808. :;> 
809. FLOOD FEE 9 17.00 
810. 9 ·- -
811. "' 
900. Items Required by lender to be Paid In Advance 
90 1. Interest From to @$ per day "' 
902. Mortgage Insurance premium for months to $ 
903. Hazard insurance premium for year(s) to $ 
904. "' 1000. Reserves Deposited with lender 
1001. Hazard insurance months@$ per month 
.,. 
1002. Mortqage insurance months@$ per month "' 
1003. City property taxes months@$ per month "' 
1004. County property taxes months@ $ per month ::;> 
1005. Annual assessments months@ $ per month "' 
1006. months@$ per month ::j 
1007 . months@ $ per month "" 
1008. months@$ per month ~ 
1100. Title Charges 
1101. Settlement or closing fee to "' 
1102. Abstract or title search to "' 
1103. Title examination to "' 
1104. Title insurance binder to :;-. 
1105. Document preparation to "' 
1106. Notary fees to "' 
1107. Attorney's fees to 
(includes above item numbers) $ 
1108. Tit le insurance toPlONEER TITLE COMPANY 
$225.00 (includes above item numbers) 
1109. Lender's Coverage $ ;;,. 
1110. Owner' s Coverage $ :;;; 
1111. "' 
1112. :;> 
11 13. :;;; 
00()1'15 
1501.BANK OF AMERICA $101,904.99 
1502-BENEFICIAL $7662.00 l 
$26 380.00 f-! 1503.BANK Of AMERICA 
• d.\ F" 
£.t 












1520. TOTAL DISBURSED 
$154,535.99 {enter on line 1603} 
Exh. 'o. f: 
0..•5-\\ -\) 
.~~ 
M• M CoHrl R• ,.'i 
form HUD· 1 A 12i94l ref. f\ES 
EST225 (LASE 
1200. Government Recording and Transfer Charges 
1201. Recording fees s21.oo 
1202. City/county tax/stamps s 
1203. State tax/stamps $ 
1204. s 
1205. $ 
1300. Additional Settlement Charges 
1301 . Survey to s 
1302. Pest inspection to s 
1303. Architectural/engineering services to s 




1400. Total Settlement Charges (enter on line 1602) $1063.00 
\ 
01.76 
N. NET SETTLEMENT 
1600. Loan Amount $ 250,000.00 
1601. Plus Cash/Check from 
Borrower $ 
1602. Minus Total Settlement 
Charges (iine 1400i $1063.00 
1603. Minus Total Disbursements 
to Others (line 15201 $154,535.99 
1604. Equals Disbursements 
to Borrower (after 
$94,401.01 expiration of any 
applicable rescission 
period required by !awl 
form HUD-1A 12194! ref. RESPA 
E.ST226 !LASER) 
Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351 
John J. Browder, ISB #7531 
LOPEZ & KBLLY, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100 
PO Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701-0856 
Telephone: (208) 342-4300 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344 
2700.024\ReplySupportMSJ.wpd 
Attorneys for Defendants 
3 0 2012 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., Case No. CVlO - 3993 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, 
DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND 
CAPITOL WEST'S REPLY TO 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Defendants. 
By and through undersigned counsel, Defendants Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals 
(sometimes hereinafter "Defendants" or "Massey") file their Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants 
Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement 
(the "Reply"). This Reply is supported by the pleadings, papers and affidavits filed in this lawsuit. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Massey moved for summary judgment on each of the Plaintiff's three causes of action: (1) 
DEFENDANTS MAS SEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- I 
0001.77 
negligence; (2) negligent misrepresentation; and (3) breach of contract. First, the legal basis for Massey's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the negligence cause of action is that Massey did not owe Idahy any 
duty upon which to predicate that claim. Second, the gravamen of all of the Plaintiff's causes of action 
is negligent misrepresentation, which Idaho does not recognize except against accountants. And third, the 
breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law because, in addition to being a reconstituted negligent 
misrepresentation count, there is no consideration, and, hence, no contract or privity between the Plaintiff 
and Massey. Alternatively, even if there is a contract, the Plaintiff is alleging a breach of the standard of 
care, and not a breach of an independent contractual duty. 
The Plaintiff, in turn, does not raise a question of material fact sufficient to defeat Massey's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Notably, the Plaintiff does not dispute that Idaho does not recognize negligent 
misrepresentation against appraisers, or argue for a good faith extension of the law. Nor does the Plaintiff 
seriously contest Massey's argument that the gravamen of the breach of contract claim is professional 
negligence. That leaves the professional negligence claim. 
The professional negligence cause of action fails as a matter of law for at least two reasons. First, 
although it is nominally titled "professional negligence," properly characterized it is a negligent 
misrepresentation cause of action, which, again, Idaho only recognizes against accountants. Second, the 
Plaintiff maintain<> that Massey should be held liable to Idahy despite the existence of the following 
undisputed facts that compel the conclusion that Massey did not owe a duty to Idahy: 
Idahy was not the Intended User of Massey's appraisal. 
• Idahy was not a Client of Massey . 
• There was no appraiser/client relationship between Massey and Idahy . 
• Massey has never spoken with anybody at Idahy and did not know Idahy had received a 
DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
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copy of the appraisal until after the borrowers, the Hruzas, already had defaulted. 
Idahy does not even know how it obtained Massey's appraisal. 
As between Massey and his Client/Intended User, Clearwater Mortgage, Inc., the appraisal 
was an incomplete or inchoate work product that was not be relied upon. 
Idahy's position lacks merit as a matter of law. It reduces to the absurd proposition that an 
appraiser owes a tort duty to an undefined and potentially limitless class of third-party non-clients simply 
because they improperly obtained a report that was intended for another, and which was undeniably 
rescinded by the parties who contemplated it. There is no support for this argument in law and fact and, 
accordingly, the Court should reject it and grant summary judgment in favor of Massey on all of the 
Plaintiff's causes of action. 
A. Because Massey Did Not Owe Idahy a Duty, Plaintiff's Negligence Claim Fails As a 
Matter of Law.1 
The Plaintiff's reliance on the three paragraphs contained in the appraisal report, and which are 
excerpted on page 3 of Plaintiff's Response, is unavailing. The first merely states what Joe Huffman made 
clear in his affidavit: that an appraisal is for the Client or Intended User to evaluate a property. Idahy was 
neither a Client nor an Intended User. See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at <JJ:<l[ 7-9. The second paragraph is 
irrelevant to the issue of whether a duty to Idahy exists because it only states that the report may be 
disclosed to another lender at the borrower's request. Here, however, there is no evidence the Hruzas 
requested that the report be transmitted to Idahy, which, in any event, does not know how it obtained the 
appraisal. Furthermore, reliance on work product of an appraiser selected by the borrower is improper 
under USP AP and federal guidelines regulating credit unions. Exh. B, 21, Aff. of Counsel & Affidavit 
1 Massey incorporates by reference hereto the analyses regarding its argument that Massey 
did not owe Idahy any tort duty that are contained in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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of Joe Huffman,~[ 14. But more importantly, it is irrelevant because by itself, distribution of the appraisal 
to Idahy would not create the appraiser-client relationship, as it is the engagement for an appraisal 
Assignment that creates that relationship. See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at U 9, 10 & 12. 
The third paragraph suffers a similar fate. Once again, there is no evidence the borrowers requested 
Idahy to rely on the appraisal, as Idahy does not know how it received it. But even if they had, it would 
not create the appraiser-client relationship, which again, only springs from engagement for an appraisal 
Assignment. See id. Moreover, the Plaintiff ignores what are two of the most important undisputed facts 
of this case: ( l) the Client, which was Clearwater Mortgage, Inc., and Massey, undisputedly, rescinded the 
Agreement for appraisal services; and (2) Idahy failed to comply with industry practice by obtaining a letter 
of assignment transferring the appraisal from Clearwater Mortgage, Inc. to Idahy. See Affidavit of Ernie 
Menchaca, at ~m 8, 9 & Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at 19. 
Another flaw with the Plaintiff's analysis of this issue is that it renders meaningless the appraiser-
client relationship as defined by USP AP. Under Plaintiff's view, anybody who obtains and uses a copy 
of the appraisal is owed a tort duty. This is true even if the appraiser never speaks to the recipient, which 
is the situation here, and does not know for what purpose the appraisal was used, or the identity of the 
recipient lender. 
These are not a irrelevant or theoretical considerations. Like any professional, an appraiser would 
want to know the identity of his or her client. Does the lender have a reputation for rigorous underwriting? 
Does it pay its bills? Is it overzealously litigious? These questions and many more could play into an 
appraiser's decision to enter into an appraiser-client relationship and, if it does, the terms and conditions 
of that relationship. Under the Plaintiff's theory, the appraiser is deprived of answers to all of these 
questions. Instead, the appraisal is a talisman that can be passed from individual to individual, or company 
DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
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to company, granting negligence and breach of contract causes of action to anybody who uses it to make 
bad loans. 
Additionally, contrary to Plaintiff's position, the $800 check it sent is irrelevant to whether Massey 
owed Idahy a tort duty. The check was cut and cashed by the Defendant's bookkeeper after the close of 
escrow. And the check does not state to which property it pertains. Regardless, it is the "engagement for 
an 'Assignment,' not payment ... that creates the appraiser-client relationship." See Affidavit of Joe 
Huffman, at~[ 10. 
Nor does the check establish privity because it is not consideration. "To constitute consideration, 
a performance or a return promise must be bargained for. A performance or return promise is bargained 
for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange 
for that promise." See Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 780, 215 P.3d 494 (2009), 
quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981 ). Here, there was no bargained for exchange 
between Massey and Idahy. They undisputedly never spoke with one another, and the $800 check was cut 
several months after Massey and Clearwater, Mortgage, Inc. rescinded the Agreement for appraisal 
services. As such, there is no consideration, no privity, no contract and no tort duty. 2 
B. The Plaintiff Misinterprets Case Law Upon Which Massey is Relying. 
Instead of marshaling case law standing for the proposition that an appraiser owes a tort duty to 
an undefined class of third-party non-clients with whom the appraiser has never spoken and has no 
2 The Plaintiff misrepresents the record of the alleged colloquy between attorney Shild 
and Connie Miller regarding the $800 check. The Plaintiff reports on pages 4 and 5 that when 
Miller asked Shild why Massey accepted the check, attorney Shild stated that he did not want to 
comment about the payment. This is exactly opposite of what happened according Ms. Miller's 
notes, which are Exhibit G to the 30(b)(6) deposition of the Plaintiff. Namely, it was Ms. Miller 
who said she did not want to comment about the $800 payment in response to Mr. Shild' s 
question whether Idahy wanted the $800 back. Regardless, it is irrelevant to the issue of whether 
Massey owed Idahy a tort duty, or if there was a contract between the two. 
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Agreement, the Plaintiff tries to distinguish the case law that clearly supports Massey's position. Or in the 
case of Christiansen v. Roddy, 186 Cal.App.3d 780 (1986), the Plaintiff ignores the case law completely. 
It is clear however, the case law discussed by the parties favors the Defendant's analysis of this case. 
The Plaintiff's failure to address Christiansen v. Roddy is especially telling. In that case, a 
California appellate court held that an appraiser did not owe a duty of care to a class of investors because 
the appraiser did not perform the appraisal for the investors, but for an individual who matched investors 
with loans. See id., at 783. Furthermore, the appraiser did not know the investors, and was not aware until 
after a claim was made that they were considering loaning money secured by the appraiser property. See 
id., at 787. 
The same analysis applies in this case. It is undisputed that Massey performed the appraisal for 
Clearwater Mortgage, Inc. It also is undisputed that Massey and Clearwater Mortgage, Inc. rescinded the 
Agreement for appraisal services. Moreover, as in Roddy, Massey did not know Idahy, and was not aware 
until after it made a claim that Idahy purportedly relied upon it. Roddy suggests Massey did not owe the 
Plaintiff a tort duty. 
In addition, Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish Decatur Ventures, LLC v. Daniel, 485 F.3d 387, 390 
(7th Cir. 2007) falls flat. As the excerpt on page 10 of the Plaintiff's Response clearly states, Indiana3 
limits a professional' s liability to the client and any "third party who the professional knows will see and 
rely upon" it. Receipt of the professional' s opinion is insufficient. The court confidently added that, 
although Indiana could change its law, the court doubted it would do so "by treating people the 
professional has never heard of, and who are not the professional's clients, as third-party beneficiaries of 
a contract between the Professional and the actual client." See, id. Under that test, Massey cannot be 
3 The Federal Circuit Court was applying Indiana law. 
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liable because Idahy was his Client and Massey did not know Idahy, or any lender for that matter, would 
rely on an inchoate and rescinded appraisal. 
Similarly, the Plaintiff's excerpt of another case Massey relied on, is unavailing. Huntington 
Mortgage Company v. Mortgage Power and Financial Services, Inc., 90 F.Supp.2d 670, 673 (D. Md. 
2000). The excerpt states that, absent privity, appraisers do not owe a duty in negligence for purely 
economic loss. But that is the situation in this case. There is no contract or privity between Massey and 
Idahy.4 As such, under the reasoning of Huntington Mortgage, Massey did not owe Idahy a duty of care. 
Likewise, the contention that Emmons v. Brown, 600 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) supports the 
Plaintiff is incorrect. In that case, the Court held that an appraiser who was not in privity with borrowers 
and lacked "actual knowledge" the borrowers would rely on the appraisal, "owed no duty of care." Again, 
that is the situation here. There is no contract or privity between Massey and Idahy; as such, Massey does 
not owe Idahy a duty of care under the principles enunciated in Emmons v. Brown. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts establish that as a matter of law the Plaintiff is not entitled to recovery from 
Massey. The negligent misrepresentation claim fails because Idaho does not recognize it. The breach of 
contract claim fails because: ( 1) there is no contract between the parties; (2) there is no alleged breach of 
an independent contractual obligation; and (3) in any case, the gist of the breach of contract claim is 
negligent misrepresentation. And finally, the negligence claim fails for two reasons. First, like the 
contract claim, the negligence cause of action is properly characterized as negligent misrepresentation. 
4 Huntington also is notable because the cause of action at issue was negligent 
misrepresentation. This adds credence to Massey's argument that Plaintiff's claims all are 
properly characterized as negligent misrepresentation. 
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Second, under the facts of this case, Massey did not owe a duty of care to Idahy, which was not his Client 
nor an Intended User of the rescinded appraisal. 
For the reasons set forth above and in the record, the Defendants respectfully request that the Court 
grant summary judgment in their favor and dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice. 
DATED this 2'1 day of January, 2012. 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
By: ~~~~~-r-~~~~~~ 
Michael E.. K ly, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for the Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this '2. f day of January, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated below, 
addressed as follows: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
WILSON & MCCOLL 
420 W. Washington 
PO Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-9100 
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Patrick J. Collins 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
700 17th St., Suite 1820 
Denver, CO 80202 
Telephone: (303) 296-7700 
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160 
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Jeffrey M. Wilson, 615 
Wilson & McColl 
IT.'. ~ '.' ! l 
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone: 208~345-9100 
Patrick J. Collins, #13046 
Collins & Coldwell, LLC 
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820 
Denver, CO 80202 
Telephone: 303-296-7700 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTPJCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT · 
OF TIIE ST ATE OF IDA.BO, IN AND FOR IBE COUNTY OF CANYON 







Case No. CVl0-3993 
PLAINTffl•''S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS WADE l't!ASSEY AND 
CAPITOL WEST APPRAISALS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JlJDGMENT 
Plaintift~ by and through its undersigned counsel, reply to Defendants Wade Massey and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc. (hereinafter, "Plaintiff) filed with the Court a Complaint 
against Defendants Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisers (hereinafter, 11Defendantsn or 
"Massey") asse111ng claims for professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach 
of contract. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a Motion and Memorandum in Support of Summary 
Judgment. Plaintiff now submits its Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Plaintiff inCOJT)Orates by reference the legal standard set forth m its Motion and 
Memorandwn in Support of Su..111mary Judgment. 
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment argues that 
Massey's Appraisal was prepared exclusively for Clearwater Mortgage and that Idahy Federal 
Credit Union, n/k/a Icon Federal Credit Union (hereinafterj "Idahy FCU") was not a 1'client'' of 
Defendants nor an "intended user" of the Appraisal as defined by the Uniform Standards of 
Professional Appraisal Practice (hereinafter, "USPAP"). Based on thls argument, Defendants 
assert that they did not owe a duty to Plaintiff and cannot be held liable for negligence. 
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could serve as a basis for breach" in tort or contract1. However, there is no legitimate legal or 
factual basis for either of Defendants' arguments. 
A. Per the language of the Uniform Residential Appraisal Report and USPAP, 
Defendants owed a duty to Icon as an "intended user" of the Appraisal 
The "Appraisal and Report Identification", which is signed by Massey and accompanies 
Defendants' Uniform Residential Appraisal Report (hereinafter, "Appraisari) lists three types of 
appraisals: a "self contained" appraisal; a "summary" appraisal; and a "restricted use" appraisal. 
Each type of appraisal contains a box next to the title. Notably, Defendants' Appraisal has a 
check next to the box labeled "summary1' clearly meaning that the Appraisal could be used and 
relied upon by Idahy FClT2. 
USPAP Standard 2-2(c), requires that a "specific use" state a promii.1ent restriction that 
limits use of the report to a specified client and warns that the appraisers opinions and 
conclusions .set forth in the report may not be understood properly without additional information 
in the appraisers work fiie. However, in this case, Defendants did not define the Appraisal as a 
"restricted use" appraisal but rather as a ''summary" appraisal under USP AP Standard 2-2(b). 
Standard 2-2(b) requires only that an appraiser state the identity of the client or any intended user 
by name or type. 
In light of the fact that the Appraisal was identified by Defendants' as a 
4'summarl' appraisal, Paragraph 23 provides: 
1 See, Defendant~ Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
fg. 2. 
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"THE BORROWER, ANOTHER LENDER AT THE REQUEST OF THE 
BORROWER, THE MORTGAGEE OR ITS SUCCESSORS OR 
ASSIGNS ... MAY RELY ON THIS APPRAISAL REPORT AS PART OF 
ANY MORTGAGE FINANCE TRANSACTION THAT INVOLVES ANY 
ONE OR MORE OF THESE PARTIES." 
11U.ll't) r. 'J/0 
In addition; the Appraiser Certification (hereinafter, "Certification") contained in the Appraisal, 
states in paragraph 21 that lender/client (Clearwater Mortgage): 
"MAY DISCLOSE OR D!STRIBUTE THIS REPORT TO: ... ANOTHER 
LENDER AT THE REQUEST OF THE BORROWER; A MORTGAGEE 
OR ITS SUCCESSORS OR ASSIGNS ... " 
Defendants' identification of an "intended user" of its Appraisal by type is in accordance 
with the USPAP definition of "intended user", as follows: 
"THE CLIENT AND ANY OTHER PARTY AS IDENTIFIED, BY NAME OR 
B~' TYPc, AS USERS OF THE APPRAISAL, APPRAISAL REVIEW, OR 
APPRAISAL CONSULTING REPORT BY THE APPRAISER ON THE 
BASIS OF COMMUNICATfON WITH THE CLIENT AT THE TIME OF 
ASSIGNMENT." 
Not only does USPAP, quoted above, allow for an "intended user'' that is identified by 
''type", but, significantly, the language of the Appraisal, signed by Massey as "appraiser", clearly 
evidences that fact that Defondants agreed to engage Idahy FCU as an '4intended user" of the 
Appraisal. Defendants' "Appraisal and Report Identification" confirms that an "intended user" 
of Defendants' Appraisal may be identified by type. Further, Defendants specified the "type'' of 
"intended user" of the Appraisal when they chose to include language in the Appraisal stating 
that a lender or mortgagee "may rely on this Appraisal Report as part of any mortgage finance 
transaction", Defendants also included language in the Appraiser Certification stating that the 
client may "disclose or distribute this report ... at the request of the borrower". All of this 
language, taken together, clearly evidences a duty owed by Defendants to ldahy FCU, who, 
. 4 
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under the written terrns of the Appraisal, was entitled to rely on it as the lender of the Hruzas' 
mortgage loan. 
B. Defendants breached the duty owed to Idahy FCU as an "intended user" of their 
Appraisal 
Defendants continue to maintain that the standard of care was not breached because the 
Appraisal was not a ''report" that Idahy FCU could rely on when making a mortgage loan to the 
Bruzas', However~ in Defendants' ovm appraisal, Massey certified and agreed that ''another 
lender" could rely on the Appraisal in making its mortgage loan to the Bruzas, which was 
secured by the subject property in the Appraisal report 
Defendants also claim that Idahy FCU was not entitled to rely on the Appraisal because the 
Appraisal was "mutually rescinded" by Defendants and Clearvvater Mortgage before completion 
of the assigw.11ent and because of this rescission "there was no bargained for consideration" 
between Defendants and Icon3• However, the Defendants' Certification on the Appraisal report 
it.self directly contradicts that claim. Further, Defendants' argument ignores the fact the 
Defendants accepted a check from Idahy FCU in the amount of $800 made payable to ""Capitol 
West Appraisals and A. Wade Massey," as payment for the Appraisal. While the fact that the 
credit union sent Defendants' a check in payment of services may not, in and of itself, be 
considered bargained for exchange, the Defendants' acceptance and negotiation of the $800 
payment from Idahy FCU established the requisite consideration. Defendants' acceptance of 
payment for its Appraisal is direct evidence of the Defendants1 consent to the credit union's use 
of and reliance upon the Appraisal report. Tue Defendants' statement that " .. .Idahy improperly 
3 See, Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appntlsals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
pg. 5 ft. note 4. 
5 
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obtained a copy of the appraisal ... " is not only false but is also preposterous under the 
citcumstances4• The Defendants' own words and Certification intended that the Appraisal could 
be used and relied on by "another lender at the request of the bo11owet"5• The Defendants' 
arguments to tbe contrary are specious and defy com.1Ilon sense6. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendants Motion 
for Summary Judgment and grant Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment based upon 
Defendants' admitted preparation of a "defective appraisal". 
DATED thi~day of February, 2012. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COLLINS & COLD\\Z1'L, LLC 
4 4 See, Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
pg. 6. 
5 See, Appraisal Certification, paragraph 21. 
~See, Defendants Massey and. Capitol West Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
pg. 6; 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that true and correct copies of the foregoing have been 
served this ~ay of February, 2012, on 1he following: 
I'vfichael E. Kelly, Esq. 
John J. Brower, Esq. 
Lopez and Kelly, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701-0856 
[Via U.S. Afrill 
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2700.024\Affid Menchaka MotionforSJ. wpd 
Attorneys for Defendants 
FEB 0 9 2012 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
S BRITTON, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THJRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN A!\1D FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURA.J.~CE SOCIETY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL \-VEST 
APPRAISALS, 
Defendants. 
ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CVl0-3993 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERNIE 
MENCHACA 
I, ERNIE MENCHACA, being first. duly sworn upon oath, do hereby depose and state under 
penalty of pe1jury: 
L That I was president of Clearwater Mortgage Inc. at all times relevant to the above-refe:enced 
case and make this affidavit of my own personal knowledge; 
2. That on or about June 13, 2007, Wade Massey performed an appraisal of the 
real property located at 16462 Plum Drive, Caldwell, Idaho 83607 for Clearwater Mortgage Inc.; 
3. That the subject Appraisal was prepared exclusively for Clearwater Mortgage Inc. to aid 
in its decision to extend a loan for Steven and Valarie Hruza; 
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4. That the subject Appraisal was incomplete and in preliminary draft form at all times and at no 
time was meant or considered to be a final draft or to be relied upon in Clearwater Mortgage Inc.' s decision 
to accept the Hruzas' loan application; 
5. That Clearwater Mortgage Inc. declined to extend a loan to the Hruzas for reasons independent 
of the subject Appraisal; 
6. That because Clearwater Mortgage Inc. dedded to deny the Hruza loan application, Wade 
Massey and I agreed that he would forego the payment for services that was due and payable at that 
juncture in lieu of completing the subject Appraisal; 
7. That Idahy never requested nor was provided a letter of assignment authorizing it to us·~ or 
rely upon the subject Appraisal in its decision to extend a Joan to the Hruzas; 
8. That it is neither proper nor customary to assign an appraisal to another underwriter wi thout 
a written letter of assignment to authorize use and reliance upon the appraisal so assigned; and 
9. Tb at it is the custom of the industry for those in the position of Idaby to use their own appraiser, 
obtain a new appraisal, or request a letter of assignment to use an appraisal initiated by a former 
underwriter and to not make lending decisions on the basis of an appraisal, even if tbe same be complete, 
that is informally submitted by another underwdter. 
FURTHER YOUR AFF1ANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
. . cl. ~/l'?bel' 
DATED this ;!%'.day (!p::o 11. 
Notary Public r Idaho 
Residing at: ="fllllidllft. fiflllD .  
My Commission Expires~lilliDftlijW: riMitt 
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-~ ,.A.M._ P.M. 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
l SANDOVAL, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
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In this action, Plaintiff asserts claims for professional negligence, negligent 
misrepresentation, and breach of contract based upon Defendant's alleged negligence in 
preparing an appraisal on certain real property located in Canyon County. Plaintiff alleges that 
ldahy Federal Credit Union, now known as Icon Credit Union, relied on the appraisal in 
approving a loan to Steven and Valerie Hruza secured by a second mortgage on the property. 
Plaintiffs Complaint, filed April 12, 2010, includes the following general allegations: 




1. Plaintiff is a Wisconsin corporation, authorized to do business in Idaho; 
2. Defendant Massey is an Idaho-licensed real estate appraiser; 
3. Capitol West was Massey's employer, during all periods relevant to the claims asserted; 
4. On June 13, 2007, Massey prepared an appraisal ofresidential property located at 16462 
Plum Drive, Caldwell, Idaho, for Clearwater Mortgage, Inc.; 
5. Massey appraised the property at $1,150,000.00; 
6. In September 2007, the Hruzas sought a $250,000.00 loan from Idahy to be secured by a 
second mortgage on the property; 
7. Relying on Massey's appraisal report, Idahy approved the loan application; 
8. Idahy paid Defendants for the appraisal by check dated September 18, 2007, and 
Defendants accepted the check; 
9. Bruzas defaulted on the loan; 
10. Idahy filed suit against Hruza on June 23, 2008; 
11. Hruza filed Chapter 7 on June 22, 2008; 
12. Idahy later learned that the assessed value of the property was $448,900; 
13. Plaintiff is subrogated to Idahy' s claim against Defendants. 
Based on the above alleged facts, Curnis seeks judgment against Defendants for 
Professional Negligence (First Claim for Relief), Negligent Misrepresentation (Second Claim 
for Relief), and Breach of Contract (Third Claim for Relief). 
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MOTIONS BEFORE THE COURT 
By Motion filed November 10, 2011, Defendants seek summary judgment dismissing 
the Complaint. Defendants' Motion is supported by a Memorandum, and the Affidavits of 
Defendant's Counsel, Wade Massey, and Ernie Menchaca. 1 
By Motion filed November 15, 2011, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment 
"determining that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and that Plaintiff is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law finding that Defendants violated the standard of care in 
preparing and issuing the real estate appraisal that is the basis of Plaintiff's claims against the 
Defendants." Plaintiff's Motion is supported by a Memorandum and two Affidavits of counsel. 
The motions came before the court for hearing on February 9, 2012. At the hearing, Mr. 
John J. Browder appeared on behalf of Defendants in support of their Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Mr. Jeffrey M. 
Wilson appeared on behalf of Plaintiff in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
opposition to Defendants' Motion. After considering the affidavits and documentary evidence 
submitted on the motion, the arguments of counsel, the file in this matter and the applicable law, 
the court makes the following determination on the motions for summary judgment. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
1 In preparing for the hearing on the instant motions, it became clear to the court that Defendants were relying on the 
Menchaca Affidavit in support of their Motion. However, the court could not locate that Affidavit in the file and 
there was no record of the Affidavit in the Register of Actions. At the hearing, the court confirmed that Plaintiffs 
had timely received service of a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with the original motion papers and granted 
Defendants leave to file a copy after the hearing. Defendants filed a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit on February 9, 
2012. 
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and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). In 
determining a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe all disputed facts liberally 
in favor of the non-moving party, and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party 
resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 
854 (1991). 
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating the absence of 
a genuine issue of material fact. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho 415, _, 
234 P.3d 739, 742 (2010). As a general rule, ifreasonable minds could reach different 
conclusions on the evidence presented, the court must deny the motion. Id. However, where 
the case will be tried without a jury, the district court, as the trier of fact, may draw the most 
probable inferences from the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant summary 
judgment, despite potentially conflicting inferences from the evidence. Id. 
The party moving for summary judgment may satisfy his or her initial burden by 
establishing, either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by 
reviewing the nonmoving party's evidence, that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove an 
element of a claim or defense at trial. McCorkle v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 141 
Idaho 550, 554, 112 P.3d 838, 842 (2005). Once the moving party does so, the nonmoving 
party must adduce sufficient admissible evidence to support a finding by the trier of fact in the 
nonmoving party's favor on such element or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so 
under I.R.C.P. 56(f). Id. 
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
As previously indicated, Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing all three 
claims asserted against them: Professional Negligence (First Claim for Relief), Negligent 
Misrepresentation (Second Claim for Relief), and Breach of Contract (Third Claim for Relief). 
I. Plaintiff's Negligence Claim 
Plaintiffs First Claim for Relief (Professional Negligence) includes the following 
allegations: 
20. The Defendants had a duty to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members 
of the profession commonly possess. 
21. The Defendants breached this duty by utilizing comparable sales values ("comps") that 
were dissimilar in age and location from the Property to formulate the appraisal. 
22. Idahy reasonably relied on the Defendants' appraisal to be an accurate valuation of the 
Property and relied on it in granting a $250,000.00 loan to the Hruzas. 
Defendants seek summary judgment dismissing this claim on the basis that Plaintiff 
cannot establish that Defendants owed any duty to Idahy, as a matter of law. 
A. Duty 
A party asserting a claim for negligence must prove: (1) a duty, recognized by law, 
requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) breach of that duty; (3) a 
causal connection between the defendant's conduct and damage/injury to the plaintiff; and (4) 
actual loss or damage. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 
311 (1999). 
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- 5 -
01.98 
The question of whether a duty exists is one oflaw. Id., 133 Idaho at 400, 987 P.2d at 
312. 
As a general rule, there is no duty to act to assist or protect another, absent unusual 
circumstances which justify imposing such an affirmative responsibility. Id., 133 Idaho at 399, 
987 P .2d at 311. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 3 l 4A (1965) provides a non-exclusive list 
of relationships giving rise to a duty to protect or assist. Id. (Common carrier-passenger, 
innkeeper-guest, landowner- invitees/licensees, one who takes custody of another.). All of 
these relationships share the trait that one person has assumed responsibility for another's safety 
or has deprived another of his or her normal opportunities for self-protection. Id, 133 Idaho at 
401, 987 P.2d at 313. No such relationship exists on the facts of the present case. 
A person may create a duty to another to perform an act in a non-negligent manner by 
voluntarily undertaking to perform that act, even though the person had no prior duty to perform 
the act. Id., 133 Idaho at 400, 987 P.2d at 312; Baccus v. Ameripride Services, Inc., 145 Idaho 
346, 350, 179 P.3d 309, 313 (2008). "In such case, the duty is to perform the voluntarily-
undertaken act in a non-negligent manner." Baccus, 145 Idaho at 350. "So, '[l]iability for an 
assumed duty ... can only come into being to the extent that there is in fact an undertaking."' 
Id (quoting Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389, 34 P.3d 1069, 1072-73 (2001)). 
Based upon the allegations of the Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Massey assumed a duty 
to Idahy by including the following representation in his Appraisal Report: 
23. The borrower, another lender at the request of the borrower, the mortgagee or its 
successors and assigns, mortgage insurers, government sponsored enterprises, and other 
secondary market participants may rely on this appraisal report as part of any mortgage 
finance transaction that involves any one or more of these parties. 
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Specifically, according to Paragraph 31 of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 
assumed a duty to Idahy as "another lender at the request of the borrower." 
In support of their contention that Massey did not assume any duty to Idahy, Defendants 
make the following argument: 
1. The Massey Appraisal includes a Cover Letter/Scope of Work Defined identifying the 
intended user as Clearwater Mortgage and the borrower as the Hruzas. 
2. Paragraph 21 of the Appraisal identifies the parties to whom the lender is authorized to 
disclose or distribute the appraisal. These parties include "the borrower, another lender at 
the request of the borrower" and the rest of the parties identified in Paragraph 23, quoted 
above. 
3. At Plaintiff's deposition, Connie Miller, who appeared on behalf of Cumis, stated "We 
never identified- I'm not aware that we ever identified how we got the appraisal." (Tr. 
21, 11. 10-12). 
4. In his Affidavit, Mr. Menchaca, identified as the President of Clearwater Mortgage, Inc. 
at all times relevant to the claims asserted by Plaintiff, states: 
a. Massey prepared the Appraisal at issue "exclusively for Clearwater Mortgage Inc. 
to aid in its decision to extend a loan for Steven and Valarie Hruza;" 
b. Clearwater decided against extending a loan to the Hruzas "for reasons 
independent of the subject Appraisal;" 
c. Idahy did not request and was not "provided a letter of assignment authorizing it 
to use or rely upon the subject Appraisal in its decision to extend a loan to the 
Hruzas;" 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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d. It is "neither proper nor customary to assign an appraisal to another underwriter 
without a written letter of assignment to authorize use and reliance on the 
appraisal so assigned;" 
e. It is "the custom of the industry for those in the position of Idahy to use their own 
appraiser, obtain a new appraisal, or request a letter of assignment to use an 
appraisal initiated by a former underwriter and to not make lending decisions on 
the basis of an appraisal, even if the same be complete, that is informally 
submitted by another underwriter." 
In the court's view, the foregoing evidence cited by Defendants establishes,primafacie, 
that Massey did not assume any duty to Idahy by preparation of the Appraisal Report for 
Clearwater Mortgage. Massey prepared the Appraisal Report for Clearwater, as his client and 
the intended user, for purposes of Clearwater's consideration of a loan application to the Hruzas. 
The Appraisal report, in Paragraph 21, identifies a specific list of parties to whom Clearwater is 
authorized to disclose the Report. Pursuant to Paragraph 23 of the Report, Massey assumed a 
duty to any such party or parties to whom Clearwater disclosed the Report by stating that such 
parties "may rely on this appraisal report as part of any mortgage finance transaction that 
involves any one or more of these parties." The Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca states that Idahy 
never received an assignment of the Report from Clearwater. While Plaintiff alleges that Massey 
assumed a duty to Idahy as "another lender at the request of the borrower," there is no evidence 
in the record to support the conclusion that Clearwater disclosed the Report to Hruza or that 
Hruza requested that Clearwater disclose the Report to Idahy. In fact, the only evidence 
provided by Plamtiff with respect to how it came into possession of the Report is its own 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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deposition testimony that it "never identified - I'm not aware that we ever identified how we got 
the appraisal." 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing 
Plaintiffs First Claim for Relief for Professional Negligence is granted. 
II. Plaintiff's Claim for Negligent Misrepresentation 
Plaintiff's Second Claim for Relief (Negligent Misrepresentation) includes the following 
allegations: 
25. The Defendants' representation to Idahy that the Property was worth $1,150,000.00 was 
false. 
26. The Defendants were negligent both in formulating the appraisal and in accepting 
payment for the appraisal containing the false value of the Property. 
27. The Defendants violated the standard of care in formulating the appraisal. 
28. Idahy reasonably relied on the appraisal to be an accurate representation of the value of 
the property in making a loan to Hruza. 
As recently as 2007, the Idaho Supreme Court emphasized that "this Court strictly and 
narrowly confined the tort of negligent misrepresentation to professional relationships involving 
an accountant." Mannas v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 935, 155 P.3d 1166, 1174 (2007) (citing Duffin 
v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n., 126 Idaho 1002, 1010, 895 P.2d 1195, 1203 (1995). As the Court 
concluded in Mannas, "This case does not involve a professional accounting relationship .... 
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on this claim." 
Based on the foregoing precedent, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
dismissing Plaintiffs Second Claim for Relief (Negligent Misrepresentation) is granted. 
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III. Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Claim 
Plaintiffs Third Claim for Relief (Breach of Contract) includes the following allegations: 
31. The appraisal report prepared by the Defendants expressly authorized Idahy, a "lender at 
the request of the borrower," to rely on the appraisal report in approving the second 
mortgage loan to the Hruzas. 
32. An assignment of the right to rely on the representations made in the appraisal report was 
transferred to Idahy when the Defendants received and accepted payment from Idahy in 
exchange for the appraisal. 
33. Privity to enforce the promises contained in the appraisal report was created between 
Idahy and the Defendants when Clearwater assigned its rights under the contract to Idahy. 
34. The Defendants breached the contract by failing to render the contracted-for performance 
to Idahy. 
3 5. The Plaintiff has suffered damages on account of the Defendants' breach of contract. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "if a cause of action for breach of a duty based 
upon a contractual promise could also be maintained without the contract by virtue of a statutory 
or common law duty, then the action is founded upon tort, not contract." Sumpter v. Holland 
Realty, Inc., 140 Idaho 349, 354, 93 P.3d 680, 685 (2004). The Sumpter Court relied upon the 
earlier case of Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 138, 483 P.2d 664, 669 (1971) for this 
proposition: "As Taylor states above, '[i]f the relation of the plaintiff and the defendants is such 
that a duty to take care arises therefrom irrespective of contract and the defendant is negligent, 
then the action is one of tort."' Id. at 353. While a contract may create a state of things that 
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furnishes the occasion for a tort, if the duty to take care arises irrespective of the contract and the 
defendant is negligent then the action sounds in tort, not contract. Id. 
The evidence before the court indicates that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is based 
exclusively on Massey's alleged negligence in preparing the Appraisal Report. While Plaintiff 
alleges that the relationship between Massey and Idahy was created by contract, the duty 
Plaintiff alleges Massey owed to it arises independent of the alleged contract (the duty to 
exercise due care, regardless of any standard set forth in a contract). 
In light of this, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's Third 
Claim of Relief for Breach of Contract is granted. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In view of the foregoing, the court need not reach Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing the 
claims asserted against them in this action is GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
I~ 
Dated this J/L_day of February, 2012. 
,~_ .. (?,~_ 
( ... . Jjlineal C. Kerrick 
· Uistrict Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the 
following, either by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid; by hand delivery; by courthouse 
basket; or by facsimile copy: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson & McColl 
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200 
Boise, Idaho 83 703 
Patrick J. Collins 
Collins & Coldwell, LLC 
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
John J. Browder 
Lopez & Kelly, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100 
P.O. Box 856 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Dated this ------- day of February, 2012. 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO 
Clerk of the Court 
by ________________ ~ 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. CVl0-3993 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT'S 
FEBRUARY 16, 2012 ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc., by and through its undersigned counsel, 
requests that this honorable Court reconsider its February 16, 2012 Order granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the claims asserted against Defendants in this 
action. In support thereof, Plaintiff submits as follows: 
I. THE COURT'S ORDER MAKES FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT ARE IN 
DISPUTE OR NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
The Court's February 16, 2012 Order states: 
206 
In the court's view, the foregoing evidence cited by Defendants 
establishes, prima facie, that Massey did not assume any duty to Idahy by 
preparation of the Appraisal Report for Clearwater Mortgage. Massey prepared 
the Appraisal Report for Clearwater, as his client and the intended user, for 
purposes of Clearwater's consideration of a loan application to the Hruzas. The 
Appraisal report, in Paragraph 21, identifies the specific list of parties to whom 
Clearwater is authorized to disclose the Report. Pursuant to Paragraph 23 of the 
Report, Massey assumed a duty to any such party or parties to whom Clearwater 
disclosed the Report by stating that such parties "may rely on this appraisal report 
as part of any mortgage finance transaction that involves any one or more of these 
parties." The Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca states that Idahy never received an 
assignment of the Report from Clearwater. While Plaintiff alleges that Massey 
assumed a duty to Idahy as "another lender at the request of the borrower," there 
is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Clearwater disclosed 
the Repun to Hruza or that Hruza requested that Clearwater disclose the Report to 
Idahy. In fact, the only evidence provided by Plaintiff with respect to how it 
came into possession of the Report is its own deposition testimony that it "never 
identified - I'm not aware that we ever identified how we got the appraisal." 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
dismissing Plaintiffs First Claim for Relief for Professional Negligence is 
granted. 
The Court failed to consider or perhaps did not see in Plaintiffs Memoranda the 
undisputed fact that Idahy Federal Credit Union (hereinafter, "Idahy FCU") issued a check for 
$800 to Defendant, Capitol West Appraisals, as payment for the Appraisal. Defendant Wade 
Massey (hereinafter, "Massey"), who is employed by Capitol West Appraisals and prepared the 
Appraisal, admitted in his deposition that he prepared a "defective appraisal." (Id. at Pg. 10, Ln. 
1-3). He said that his Appraisal "had ... errors that we were aware of, that me and my client were 
aware of." (Id. at Pg. 10, Ln. 1-4 ). He recalled receiving payment of $800 from Icon even 
though he did not correct the "errors" or inform the credit union about the errors in his 
"defective" Appraisal. The $800 check, made payable to Capitol West Appraisals and A. Wade 
Massey and deposited into the Defendants' bank account, conclusively demonstrates that Idahy 
FCU properly paid for the Appraisal and that the Defendants accepted payment for the Appraisal 
(See, Exhibit A). The Court's conclusion that there is no evidence to show how Idahy FCU came 
2 
into possess10n of the Appraisal is erroneous. Idahy FCU paid for the Appraisal and the 
Defendants accepted payment knowing that the Appraisal contained false and inaccurate 
information. 
The Court's conclusion and decision are based upon disputed facts. The Order cites the 
Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca who has yet to be deposed in the litigation. It assumes that 
Menchaca's statements are true and accurate despite the fact that his Affidavit is directly 
contradicted by the Certification made by Massey in the written Appraisal. The Court has 
usurped the function of a jury by making factual findings in granting summary judgment in favor 
of Defendants. 
The "Appraisal and Report Identification", which is signed by Massey and accompanies 
Defendants' Uniform Residential Appraisal Report, lists three types of appraisals: a "self 
contained" appraisal; a "summary" appraisal; and a "restricted use" appraisal. Each type of 
appraisal contains a box next to the title. Notably, Defendants' Appraisal has a check next to the 
box labeled "summary", clearly meaning that the Appraisal could be used and relied upon by 
Idahy FCU as set forth below. The Court appears to rely heavily on the deposition testimony 
that Idahy FCU CEO, at the time of her deposition, stated "... I'm not aware that we ever 
identified how we got the appraisal." However, she did know and had proof that Idahy FCU paid 
the Defendants for the Appraisal and relied upon it in making the loan. The fact that she did not 
know the details of how the Appraisal was delivered or received by Idahy FCU is not dispositive. 
USPAP Standard 2-2(c) requires that a "specific use" or "restricted use" appraisal state a 
prominent restriction that limits use of the report to a specified client and warns that the 
appraiser's opinions and conclusions set forth in the report many not be understood properly 
without additional information in the appraiser's work file. However, in this case, Defendants 
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did not identify the Appraisal as a "restricted use" appraisal, but rather identified it as a 
"summary" appraisal under USP AP Standard 2-2(b ). Standard 2-2(b) requires only that an 
appraiser state the identity of the client or any intended user by name or type. In this case, 
Massey did identify the identity of the clients by both "name" and "type." 
In light of the fact that the Appraisal was identified by Defendants as a "summary" 
appraisal, Paragraph 23 provided: 
"THE BORROWER, ANOTHER LENDER AT THE REQUEST OF THE 
BORROWER, THE MORTGAGEE OR ITS SUCCESSORS OR ASSIGNS ... 
MAY RELY ON THIS APPRAISAL REPORT AS PART OF ANY 
MORTGAGE FINANCE TRANSACTION THAT INVOLVES ANY ONE OR 
MORE OF THESE PARTIES." 
In addition, the Appraiser Certification (hereafter, "Certification") contained in the Appraisal 
stated in Paragraph 21 that lender/client (Clearwater Mortgage): 
"MAY DISCLOSE OR DISTRIBUTE THIS REPORT TO: ... ANOTHER 
LENDER AT THE REQUEST OF THE BORROWER, A MORTGAGEEE OR 
ITS SUCCESSORS OR ASSIGNS .... " 
Defendants' identification of an "intended user" of its Appraisal by type is in accordance 
with the USP AP definition of "intended user," as follows: 
"THE CLIENT AND ANY OTHER PARTY AS IDENTIFIED, BY NAME OR 
BY TYPE, AS USERS OF THE APPRAISAL, APPRAISAL REVIEW, OR 
APPRAISAL CONSULTING REPORT BY THE APPRAISER ON THE BASIS 
OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE CLIENT AT THE TIME OF 
ASSIGNMENT." 
Not only does USPAP, quoted above, allow for an "intended user" to be identified by 
"type," but, significantly, the language of the Appraisal signed by Massey as the "appraiser" 
clearly evidences the fact that Defendants agreed to engage Idahy FCU as an "intended user" of 
the Appraisal. Defendants' "Appraisal and Report Identification" confirms that an "intended 
user" of Defendants' Appraisal may be identified by type. Further, Defendants specified the 
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"type" of "intended user" of the Appraisal when they chose to include language in the Appraisal 
stating that a lender or mortgagee "may rely on this Appraisal Report as part of any mortgage 
finance transaction." Defendants also included language in the Certification stating that the 
client may "disclose or distribute this report .... at the request of the borrower." All of this 
language, viewed in the aggregate, clearly evidences a duty owed by Defendants to Idahy FCU 
who, under the terms of the Appraisal, was entitled to rely on the Appraisal as a lender of the 
Hrnzas' mortgage loan. 
The Court erroneously concludes that the standard of care was not breached because the 
Appraisal was not a "report" that Idahy FCU was authorized to rely upon when making a 
mortgage loan to the Hrnzas. However, in Defendants' own Appraisal, Massey certified and 
agreed that "another lender" could rely on the Appraisal in making a mortgage loan to the 
Hrnzas, which was secured by the subject property in the Appraisal report. 
The Court expressed the opinion that Idahy FCU was not entitled to rely on the Appraisal 
because the Appraisal was prepared "exclusively" for Clearwater Mortgage based on the 
Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca. However, that claim is not an undisputed fact. If it was prepared 
"exclusively" for Clearwater, why did Massey accept and deposit Idahy FCU's check as payment 
for its use of the Appraisal? The Defendants' Certification on the Appraisal report itself directly 
contradicts the claims asserted in Menchaca's Affidavit. Further, Defendants' argument ignores 
the fact that the Defendants accepted a check from Idahy FCU in the amount of $800, payable to 
"Capitol West Appraisals and A. Wade Massey," as payment for the Appraisal. While the fact 
that Idahy FCU tendered a check to the Defendants as payment for services rendered may not, in 
and of itself, be considered a "bargained-for exchange", the Defendants' subsequent acceptance 
and negotiation of the $800 check from Idahy FCU fulfilled the consideration requirement. 
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Defendants' acceptance of payment from Idahy FCU for its Appraisal is direct evidence of the 
Defendants' consent to Idahy FCU's use of and reliance upon the Appraisal report. The 
Defendants' statement that " ... Idahy improperly obtained a copy of the appraisal.. .. " is not only 
false, it is preposterous in the light of the facts. Defendants' own words and Certification convey 
an intent and expectation that the Appraisal could be used and relied upon by "another lender at 
the request of the borrower." Defendants' arguments to the contrary are specious, defy common 
sense, and are wholly unsupported by the facts. 
At a minimum, there presently exists a dispute, to be decided by a jury, as to whether 
Defendants' acceptance of payment supports a conclusion that Idahy FCU was an "intended user" 
of Defendants' Appraisal. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
The purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether a trial is necessary. White v. 
Sort Intern Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is appropriate when 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50, P.3d 488, 491 (2002). In 
this case, the Court's Order ignores that the underlying facts are disputed and that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Idahy FCU was entitled to use and rely upon 
the Appraisal after paying Defendants the fee for preparation of the Appraisal. 
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court can review the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, to determine whether 
there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, and whether the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Ray v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 120 Idaho 117, 
814 P.2d 17 (1991). The Appellate Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used 
6 
by the District Court in passing upon the motion. McDonald v. Paine, 119 Idaho 725, 810 P.2d 
259 (1991). All facts in the record and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are 
viewed in favor of the party contesting the motion. Treasure Valley Bank v. Butcher, 117 Idaho 
974, 793 P.2d 206 (1990). 
The facts are that Idahy FCU tendered payment to the Defendants, the Defendants 
accepted that payment, and the Defendants deposited that payment in their bank account. In 
light of these facts, a reasonable inference would be that the Credit Union reasonably relied on 
an Appraisal for which it tendered payment. 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
In Hice v. Lott, 223 P.3d 139 (Colo. App. 2009), the Appellate Court in Colorado stated 
that when a claim of negligence is based on an allegation that a licensed appraiser was negligent, 
the Plaintiff must show that the conduct fell below the standard of care associated with that 
profession. See also, Redden v. SCI Colo. Funeral Servs., Inc., 38 P.3d 75, 80-81 (Colo. 2001). 
Further, in Command Commc'ns. Inc. v. Fritz Cos., 36 P. 3d. 182, 189 (Colo. App. 2001) the 
Colorado Court of Appeals states the applicable standard of care in a professional negligence 
case as follows: 
For those practicing a profession involving specialized knowledge 
or skill, the applicable standard of care generally requires the actor 
to possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability 
and to exercise reasonable care in a manner consistent with 
members of the profession in good standing. 
There is no legal or factual requirement that the party using and relying on an appraisal 
prove how they obtained the appraisal, especially when the appraiser admits he was paid for his 
work. However, in this case, it is undisputed that Idahy FCU paid Defendant $800 for its use of 
the Appraisal in making a $250,000 loan. 
7 
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In 1989, the United States Congress passed comprehensive legislation, the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), to address problems 
created by the savings and loan failures of the 1980s. The failures of these financial institutions 
were caused, in part, by "faulty and fraudulent" appraisals of real estate collateral that undercut 
the financial stability of these lenders. H. Rep. No. 101-54(1), at 311 (1989). To address this 
causative factor, Congress established certain requirements for real estate appraisals connected to 
federally-related transactions, including mandating that real estate appraisals be conducted "in 
accordance with uniform standards, by individuals whose competency has been demonstrated 
and whose professional conduct will be subject to effective supervision." 12 U.S.C. §3331. The 
State of Idaho has adopted the uniform standards in the Idaho Real Estate Appraiser's Act §54-
4107. 
Under this regulatory framework, real estate appraisers are subject to a variety of 
requirements, and, based on their training and experience, must be certified, licensed, or 
registered. Id. at §54-4107. Their work is governed by rules and regulations issued by the Board 
of Real Estate Appraisers. They may be disciplined or have their certification, license, or 
registration denied, suspended, or revoked for misconduct. Certain types of misconduct are 
unlawful and can subject offenders to criminal penalties. 
The Idaho Division of Real Estate adopted USP AP as "the generally accepted standards 
of professional appraisal practice." The preamble to USP AP states that the purpose of the 
standards is as follows: 
... to promote and maintain a high level of public trust in appraisal 
practice by establishing requirements for appraisers. It is essential 
that appraisers develop and communicate their analyses, opinions, 
and conclusions to intended users of their services in a manner that 
is meaningful and not misleading. 
8 
Based upon Idaho's comprehensive legislative structure, real estate appraisers practice a 
profession involving knowledge and/or skill, and their conduct should be judged according to the 
tenets of their field. The Court's Order in effect contravenes public policy as set forth in the 
FIRREA or the USP AP and allows an appraiser to accept payment for an admittedly defective 
annrais<>l that rP511ltPd in a $2"() oon Jr.an lr.ss t'l-'L ..L U....L \...L \...LV UL V ..L..L..1. ._!V' V ..l.V .LJ..V • 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this case, there is no question that the Defendants violated the standard of care. 
Indeed, Massey admitted that his appraisal was "defective and had ... errors" (See Exhibit F, Pg. 
10, Ln. 1-4) and that no one should have relied upon it. However, despite the fact that the 
Appraisal was "defective" and "had errors", Massey certified in writing that "the borrowers, 
another lender at the request of the borrower, the mortgagee or its successors and assigns, and the 
mortgage insurers ... may rely on this Appraisal report as part of any mortgage finance 
transaction that involves any one or more of these parties." The Appraisal was not exclusively 
prepared for Clearwater Mortgage and it was properly used by Idahy FCU. The Defendants 
accepted payment from Idahy FCU with full knowledge that the Appraisal was defective and 
should not be relied upon or otherwise used in approving a loan. 
Accordingly, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its Order 
granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and allow this case to proceed to trial. 
9 
0214 
DATED this ).,. Oz day of February, 2012. 
10 
Respectfully submitted, 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
·\:VI~~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVlO - 3993 
JUDGMENT 
This matter having come before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment on 
February 9, 2012, and the Court having granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants Wade 
Massey and Capitol West Appraisals in its February 17, 2012, Order on Motions for Summary 
Judgment; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does hereby order that judgment is entered in favor of 
Defendants Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals and against the Plaintiff Cumis Insurance 
Society, Inc., and that all claims asserted by Plaintiff Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. against 
JUDGMENT-I 
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Defendants Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals are dismissed with prejudice. 
Further, the Court shall consider the issue of costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 54 
of the Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure upon application by the Defendants within fourteen ( 14) days 
of the date of this J udgmen~~ined, if requested, by supplemental order of this Court. 
DATED this 15.day of March, 2012. 
I 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of March, 2012, I served a true and correct copy 
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WILSON & MCCOLL 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVlO - 3993 
DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND 
CAPITOL WEST'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
By and through undersigned counsel, Defendants Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals 
(sometimes hereinafter "Defendants" or "Massey") file their Response to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration ("Response"). This Response is supported by the pleadings, papers and affidavits lilcd 
in this lawsuit. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Massey moved for summary judgment on each of the Plaintiff's three causes of action: ( 1) 
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negligence; (2) negligent misrepresentation; and (3) breach of contract. In its Order on Motions for 
Summary Judgment ("Order"), the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Massey, ruling that: (I) 
Massey did not assume and, therefore, did not owe a legal duty to Idahy; (2) Idaho does not recognize a 
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against appraisers; and (3) Plaintiff's breach of contract 
claim failed because it was based only on Massey's alleged negligence. 
In its Motion for Reconsideration, the Plaintiff challenges the Court's Order, contending the Court 
usurped the role of the jury because, according to it, Defendant's acceptance of the check raised a question 
of material fact whether Idahy was the Intended User of the appraisal. Plaintiff's argument is not new, and 
it is as unavailing now as it was when the Plaintiff first advanced it. As established by the affidavit of 
appraiser Joe Huffman, payment does not give rise to the appraiser-client relationship. Moreover, the 
Plaintiff's narrative about the $800.00 check is misleading and controverted by Idahy's Connie Miller's 
own notes on the issue and in any case, the existence of a duty is a legal question, not a factual one. 
In sum, there is nothing erroneous with the Court's analysis and ruling that Massey did not as:-.ume 
a legal duty toward Idahy. In light of the following undisputed facts, the Court's reasoning is ironclad and 
should not be disturbed: 
• Idahy was not the Intended User of Massey's appraisal. 
• Idahy was not a Client of Massey . 
• There was no appraiser/client relationship between Massey and Idahy . 
• Massey has never spoken with anybody at Idahy and did not know Idahy had received a 
copy of the appraisal until after the borrowers, the Hruzas, already had defaulted. 
• Idahy does not even know how it obtained Massey's appraisal. 
• As between Massey and his Client/Intended User, Clearwater Mortgage, Inc., the appraisal 
was an incomplete , inchoate or rescinded work product that was not to be relied upon. 
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Nothing in the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration alters those facts or calls into question the Court's 
analysis. As such, Massey respectfully requests the Court deny Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. 
II. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. The $800.00 Check Is Irrelevant to Whether an Appraiser-Client Relationship Was 
Formed or a Legal Duty Owed. 
Plaintiff emphasizes that the Court failed to consider the portion of its Memorandum discussing 
the $800.00 check. But as the Court likely will recall, there was considerable discussion at oral argument 
regarding the check Idahy issued to Massey, and, indeed, the Court questioned both attorneys about it. 1 
More importantly, as established by the uncontroverted affidavit of Joe Huffman, payment does not create 
an appraiser-client relationship. Rather, it is the "engagement for an 'Assignment,' not payment ... that 
creates the appraiser-client relationship." See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at <][ 10 . Nor was Idahy an 
Intended User. See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at<][ 8. 
Unlike's Massey's position, Plaintiff's interpretation lacks any supporting affidavit. Moreover, 
it is fatally undercut by USPAP's advice on the issue and devolves into the absurd proposition that mere 
receipt of an undisputedly rescinded appraisal services report, and belated payment for the same, exposes 
the appraiser to tort liability. While Massey will not belabor Mr. Huffman's affidavit, it is worth noting 
USPAP Advisory Opinion 26 (2008)2, a copy of which is attached hereto for the Com1's convenience, 
1 Plaintiff continues to ignore the fact that the check was one of many cashed by Massey's 
bookkeeper; nor is there anything ou the face of the check that identifies for which property 
appraisal it was payment. 
2 The 2006-2007 USP AP was in force at the times relevant to the lawsuit. Nonetheless, 
because copies of USP AP are somewhat difficult to obtain, Massey has relied on the 2008-2009 
version because, as explained in the attached section regarding changes, Advisory Opinion 26 
was not impacted by the new USP AP version. 
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supports the analysis and conclusions contained in the Affidavit, specifically, that the "agreement" between 
the appraiser and client is paramount for establishing rights, responsibilities and obligations between 
appraisers and their clients. For example, USP AP does not permit the "readdressing" of a report to another 
party. See Adv. Op. 26, at 11. 8-11 & 29 -30. The Intended User, as noted by Mr. Huffman, is also a 
function of the "agreement" between the client and appraiser. See Adv. Op. 26, at 11. 37-40. An appraiser 
cannot identify a new intended user of the assignment ex post facto absent a new "assignment." See 
USPAP FAQ 73 (2008-2009), a copy of which is attached hereto for the Court's convenience. This 
accords with Mr. Huffman's analysis, as well as Mr. Menchaca's affidavit testimony that Idahy failed to 
procure the customary assignment of appraisal. 
Additionally, the Plaintiff's assertion that Massey's argument that Idahy' s obtainment of a copy 
of the rescinded appraisal report was improper is "false" and "preposterous" is off the mark. Once again. 
Massey's position on this issue is supported Joe Huffman's affidavit. See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at 
q[ 14. Plaintiff, by contrast, provides no support for the proposition that it is proper, let alone prudent, to 
rely on a report of unverified provenance, and by an appraiser with whom Idahy -to this day- has never 
spoken to make a $250,000.00 decision. Again, as Massey pointed out at oral argument, this case could 
have been avoided with a 30 second phone call from anybody at Idahy to either Massey or Ernie 
Menchaca. One would think that with $250,000 on the line, someone at Idahy would have picked up the 
phone and made the simple call. 
The Court v1a.s correct in declining to find a legal duty where Idahy was not Massey's Client or the 
Intended User of the inchoate appraisal, and, indeed, where Massey has never spoken with anybody at 
Idahy in his life. The law simply does not contemplate saddling an individual with potential ton I iab1 I ity 
under the facts of this case. If it did, USP AP' s concepts of" Assignment," "Client," "Intended Use" and 
"Intended User" would be rendered superfluous nullities. It also would result in an unprecedented 
DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION- 4 
223 
broadening of appraiser tort liability. 
B. Massey Offered to Give the Check Back. 
Because the Plaintiff continues to emphasize the $800.00 check, it is worth noting that Massey, by 
and through an attorney, tried to give it back. On page 4 of the Plaintiff's Response to Defendants Wade 
Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Plaintiff's Response"), the Plaintiff relies on an account of a conversation between Idahy CEO, Connie 
Miller and Ray Schild, Massey's attorney which was authored by Ms. Miller. As evidenced by Exhibit 
G, deposition of Connie Miller, a copy of which is attached to Plaintiff's Response, Millerreportedly asked 
attorney Shild after the Hruzas defaulted why Massey accepted payment. Schild did not, as Plaintiff 
mischaracterizes, say that "he did not wish to comment on the $800 payment at that point." Exhibit G, 
deposition of Connie Miller. Instead, Mr. Schild asked "[d]o you want your $800 bucks back?" Exhibit 
G, deposition of Connie Miller. According to Ms. Miller's own notes, she then replied that "I did not wish 
to comment on that at this point." Exhibit G, deposition of Connie Miller. It is reasonable to surmise that 
Ms. Miller declined Mr. Shild's offer to preserve the exact argument the Plaintiff is making now. 
C. Menchaca's Affidavit is Undisputed and Court Was Correct in Relying on it to the 
Extent it Did. 
The Plaintiff's claim that the decision is based on disputed facts because it assumes Mechanca's 
affidavit was true is bewildering and of no moment. Mr. Menchaca, who the Plaintiff could have deposed 
earlier in the case, avowed that Clearwater Mortgage and Massey rescinded the agreement to perform 
appraisal services. See Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca, at <JI<J[ 8, 9. That is not disputed. And that fact, by 
itself, vitiates Plaintiff's continued reliance on language in the Appraisal report. Nor is it disputed that 
receipt of the appraisal by Idahy would not create the appraiser-client relationship, as it is the engagement 
for an appraisal Assignment that creates that relationship. See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at <J[<J[ 9, I 0 & 12. 
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Absent that relationship or Intended User classification, it is impossible to fathom how Massey assumed 
a legal duty to Idahy. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in the record, Massey respectfully requests that the Court deny 
the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. 
DA TED this Z 3 day of March, 2012. 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
By:~~~~~--~~~~ 
Michael E. Kelly 
Attorneys for the Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this '2.~ day of March, 2012, I served a true and correct copy uf 
the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated below, 
addressed as follows: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
WILSON & MCCOLL 
420 W. Washington 
PO Box 1544 
Boise, ID 8370 l 
Telephone: (208) 345-9100 
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Patrick J. Collins 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
700 17th St., Suite 1820 
Denver, CO 80202 
Telephone: (303) 296-7700 
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160 
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FOREWORD 
The Appraisal Standards Board (ASB) of The Appraisal Foundation develops, interprets, and amends the 
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP) on behalf of appraisers and users of appraisal 
services. The 2008-2009 Edition of USPAP (2008-2009 USPAP) is effective January 1, 2008 through 
December 31, 2009. 
USPAP has five sections: DEFINITIONS, PREAMBLE, Rules, Standards and Standards Rules, and Statements 
on Appraisal Standards. For convenience ofreference, USPAP is published with this Foreword and a Table of 
Contents. These reference materials are forms of "Other Communications" provided by the ASB for guidance 
only and are not part of USP AP. 
It is important that individuals understand and adhere to changes in each edition of USPAP. State and federal 
regulatory authorities enforce the content of the current or applicable edition ofUSPAP. 
History ofUSPAP 
These Standards are based on the original Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice developed in 
1986-87 by the Ad Hoc Committee on Uniform Standards and copyrighted in 1987 by The Appraisal 
Foundation. The effective date of the original Uniform Standards was April 27, 1987. Prior to the establishment 
of the ASil in 1989, USPAP had been adopted by major appraisal organizations in North America. USPAP 
represents the generally accepted and recognized standards of appraisal practice in the United States. 
At its organizational meeting on January 30, 1989, the Appraisal Standards Board unanimously approved and 
adopted the original USPAP as the initial appraisal standards promulgated by the ASB. USPAP may be 
amended, interpreted, supplemented, or retired by the ASB after exposure to the appraisal profession, users of 
appraisal services, and the public in accordance with established rules of procedure. 
Guidance 
The ASB issues guidance in the form of Advisory Opinions, USP AP Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) and 
monthly questions and responses "USP AP Q&A." These communications do not establish new Standards or 
interpret existing Standards and are not part ofUSPAP. They illustrate the applicability of Standards in specific 
situations and offer advice from the ASB for the resolution of appraisal issues and problems. 
The USP AP Q&A is published monthly and available on The Appraisal Foundation website. These questions 
and responses are compiled and published in the USP AP Frequently Asked Questions. 
Changes to USP AP 
Over the years, USP AP has evolved in response to changes in appraisal practice. The ASB has developed a 
process for developing both Standards and guidance based, in part, on written comments submitted in response 
to exposure drafts and oral testimony presented at public meetings. 
Contacting the Appraisal Standards Board 
The ASB invites questions about USPAP, commentary on USPAP and proposed changes to USPAP from all 
interested parties, including appraisers, state enforcement agencies, users of appraisal services, and the public. 
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If you have any comments, questions, or suggestions regarding USP AP, please contact the ASB. 
U-ii 
Appraisal Standards Board 
The Appraisal Foundation 
1155 15th Street, NW, Suite 1111 
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(The 2008-2009 USPAP was adopted by the 2007 Appraisal Standards Board on June 8, 2007.) 
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Past Appraisal Standards Board Officers and Members 
1989 Board Members 1995 Board Members 2001 Board Members 
Charles B. Akerson - Chair Sherwood Darington - Chair Kenneth J. Kaiser - Chair 
John J. Leary - Vice Chair Tim Lebennan - Vice Chair Richard A. Southern - Vice Chair 
Sherwood Darington Daniel A. Dinote, Jr. Thomas 0. Jackson 
Daniel A. Dinote, Jr. W. David Snook Carla G. Glass 
John L. Gadd Laurie Van Court Lawrence E. Ofner 
Danny K. Wiley 
1990 Board Members 1996 Board Members 
John J. Leary - Chair W. David Snook - Chair 2002 Board Members 
Sherwood Darington - Vice Chair Laurie Van Court- Vice Chair Danny K. Wiley - Chair 
Daniel A. Dinote, Jr. Stephanie Coleman Lawrence E. Ofner - Vice Chair 
John L. Gadd Tim Lebe1man Carla G. Glass 
Charles B. Akerson Thomas 0. Jackson 
1997 Board Members Kenneth J. Kaiser 
1991 Board Members W. David Snook - Chair Richard A. Southern 
John J. Leary - Chair Laurie Van Court - Vice Chair 
Sherwood Darington - Vice Chair Stephanie Coleman 2003 Board Members 
Daniel A. Dinote, Jr. Kenneth J. Kaiser Danny K. Wiley - Chair 
John L. Gadd Tim Leberman Lawrence E. Ofner - Vice Chair 
Charles B. Akerson Gregory J. Accetta 
1998 Board Members Carla G. Glass 
1992 Board Members Tim Leberman - Chair Paula K. Konikoff 
John J. Leary - Chair Kenneth J. Kaiser - Vice Chair Dawn M. Molitor-Gennrich 
Sherwood Darington - Vice Chair Stephanie Coleman 
2004 Board Members Daniel A. Dinote, Jr. Yale Kramer 
John L. Gadd W. David Snook Danny K. Wiley - Chair 
Ritch LeGrand Laurie Van Comt Carla G. Glass - Vice Chair 
Gregory J. Accetta 
1993 Board Members 1999 Board Members Paula K. Konikoff 
Ritch LeGrand - Chair Kenneth J. Kaiser - Chair Dawn M. Molitor-Gennrich 
Sherwood Darington - Vice Chair Tim Lebennan - Vice Chair Lawrence E. Ofner 
Daniel A. Dinote, Jr. Yale Kramer 
John L. Gadd Lawrence E. Ofner 2005 Board Members 
John J. Leary W. David Snook Carla G. Glass - Chair 
Laurie Van Court Gregory J. Accetta - Vice Chair 
1994 Board Members James D. Cannon 
Sherwood Darington - Chair 2000 Board Members Paula K. Konikoff 
Daniel A. Dinote, Jr. - Vice Chair Kenneth J. Kaiser - Chair Dawn M. Molitor-Gennrich 
Tim Leberman Yale Kramer Danny K. Wiley 
John J. Leary Lawrence E. Ofner 
Ritch LeGrand W. David Snook 
Richard A. Southern 
Laurie Van Comt 
*No Vice Chair 
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REVISIONS TO USP AP AND USP AP ADVISORY OPINIONS 
The 2008-2009 edition ofUSPAP is the result of two exposure drafts, issued on December 15, 2006 and March 
5, 2007. Based on written responses, public testimony at Appraisal Standards Board (ASB) public meetings, 
and extensive deliberation by the Board, the ASB adopted the 2008-2009 USPAP on June 8, 2007. The adopted 
changes are incorporated in the 2008-2009 USPAP and associated guidance effective January 1, 2008 through 
December 31, 2009. 
KEY CHANGES IN USP AP AND ADVISORY OPINIONS 
DEFINITIONS: The definition of Supplemental Standards was deleted. 
• The majority of appraisers, users of appraisal services, and enforcement officials recognize that 
Supplemental Standards include laws and regulations. Appraisers must comply with laws and 
regulations because of the nature of law itself, not because of USPAP. Thus, continued use of 
Supplemental Standards as a defined term was unnecessary. 
• Descriptions of"laws" and "regulations" are provided in the SCOPE OF WORK RULE based on their 
respective Black's Law Dictionary definitions. 
• The deletion of the definition removes specific recognition of Government Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSE) as a source of assignment conditions because they provide guidelines, which are not laws or 
regulations. However, the edits do not change 1) the necessity for an appraiser acting in compliance 
with USPAP to follow GSE guidelines where applicable; and, 2) the enforcement ofUSPAP, including 
those items necessary for competent performance and meaningful reporting. 
DEFINITIONS: The definition of Advocacy was deleted. 
• EJits to the Conduct Section of the ETHICS RULE rendered the definition unnecessary because the 
tem1 is used with its common English meaning. 
ETHICS RULE: Edits were made to the Conduct section of the ETHICS RULE related to advocacy. 
• The edits make clear that advocating the cause or interest of any party or issue contradicts the 
requirement for independence. The changes do not diminish the prohibition against advocacy in 
appraisal practice; advocacy remains unacceptable. 
SUPPLEMENTAL STANDARDS RULE: The SUPPLEMENTAL STANDARDS RULE was deleted 
because the other requirements ofUSPAP eliminate the need for the Rule. 
• The duty for the appraiser to comply with applicable assignment conditions is embedded in the 
obligations to provide ethical and competent services. The SCOPE OF WORK RULE requires 
appraisers to identify the problem to be solved, which includes identification of assignment conditions. 
In communicating assignment results, the requirement that repo1is be meaningful and not misleading 
creates an obligation to comply with applicable laws, regulations, and guidelines. 
Associated Changes to the SCOPE OF WORK RULE, the Conduct section of the ETHICS RULE and 
the COMPETENCY RULE: 
• The SCOPE OF WORK RULE has been edited to replace the term "Supplemental Standards" with 
"laws and regulations." This change highlights and focuses the SCOPE OF WORK RULE on 
assignment conditions that have legal force. 
• The SCOPE OF WORK RULE states that it is the appraiser's responsibility to identify the problem to 
be solved. Therefore, the Conduct section of the ETHICS RULE was modified to remove text that 
identifies the need for an agreement between the client and appraiser when accepting an assignment 
when supplemental standards apply. 
• Text was added to the COMPETENCY RULE to acknowledge that appraisers must recognize and 
comply with laws and regulations that apply in an assignment. Laws and regulations may apply to the 
actions of the appraiser, or may apply to how an appraisal must be completed. 
©The Appraisal Foundation U-v 
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With these changes, USPAP continues to require adherence to those assignment conditions that are necessary 
for proper development and reporting. 
Standards Rule 2-3, Standards Rule 3-3, Standards Rule 5-3, Standards Rule 6-9, Standards Rule 8-3, 
and Standards Rule 10-3: Edits were made to remove the requirement that the signing appraiser have a 
reasonable basis to believe that work done by others was credible. Language was added clarifying that the 
signing appraiser(s) must not rely on the work of others ifthat appraiser has a reason to doubt that the work is 
credible. 
Standards Rules 7-3(a), 8-2(a)(ix), 6-3(b), and 6-8(n): Edits were made to the personal property appraisal 
requirements to identify and report the highest and best use: 
• The edits do not change the substance of the requirements, but better align the language with 
terminology more commonly used in personal property appraisal. 
Standards Rule 1-6(b), Standards Rule 6-7(a), Standards Rule 7-6(b), and Standards Rule 9-S(b): Edits 
were made to the requirements for reconciliation of the approaches used to arrive at the value in each Standards 
Rule. The Comment to Standards Rule 1-6 and the Comment to Standards Rule 7-6 were deleted. 
• The edits were made for clarity and consistency. 
Standards Rules 2-2(a)(vi), 2-2(b)(vi), & 2-2(c)(vi), Standards Rule 6-S(g), and Standards Rules 8-2(a)(vi), 
8-2(b)(vi), & 8-2(c)(vi): The phrase "property use conditions" was shortened to "property." The portion of the 
Comment to each Standards Rule requiring reiteration of the report date and effective date of the appraisal was 
deleted. 
• The edits were made for clarity and consistency. 
STATEMENT 10 (Retired): The Statement titled Assignments for Use by a Federally insured Depository 
institution in a Federally Related Transaction was retired. Some of the issues addressed in STATEMENT 10 
have been incorporated into the new Advisory Opinion 30, Appraisals for Use by a Federally Regulated 
Financial institution. 
• The Statement did not distinguish between laws (such as FIRREA), regulations and guidelines (such as 
the Interagency Appraisal and Evaluation Guidelines) resulting in confusion for both appraisers and 
users of appraisal services. 
• The format and complexity of STATEMENT I 0 were obstacles to its understanding and effective 
enforcement. 
• Substantial editing of STATEMENT 10 would not have resulted in increased understanding. 
ADVISORY OPINION 30 (New): Appraisals for Use by a Federally Regulated Financial Institution replaces 
the advice from retired STATEMENT 10 and addresses adherence to the applicable laws, regulations, and 
guidelines of the federal financial institution regulatory agencies required for proper appraisal development and 
reporting. 
ADVISORY OPINION 5 (Retired): Assistance in the Preparation of an Appraisal was retired because of the 
need to update and expand its guidance. The new Advisory Opinion 31, Assignments Involving More than One 
Appraiser meets these needs. 
ADVISORY OPINION 31 (New): Assignments involving More than One Appraiser offers advice on record 
keeping, signature and certification requirements in assignments that involve more than one appraiser. 
ADVISORY OPINION 32 (New): Ad Valorem Property Tax Appraisal and Mass Appraisal Assignments 
illustrates the application ofUSPAP in assignments performed by appraisers for ad valorem taxation. 
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ADVISORY OPINION 
ADVISORY OPINION 26 (A0-26) 
2 This communication by the Appraisal Standards Board (ASB) does not establish new standards or interpret 
3 existing standards. Advisory Opinions are issued to illustrate the applicability of appraisal standards in specific 
4 situations and to offer advice.from the ASB for the resolution of appraisal issues and problems. 
5 SUBJECT: Readdressing (Transferring) a Report to Another Party 
6 APPLICATION: Real Property, Personal Property, and Intangible Property 
7 THE ISSUE: 
8 After an assignment has been completed and the report has been delivered, an appraiser may be asked to 
9 "readdress" (transfer) the report to another party. Does USPAP allow an appraiser to "readdress" (transfer) a 
lo report by altering it to indicate a new recipient as the client or additional intended user when the original report 
11 was completed for another party? 
12 ADVICE FROM THE ASB ON THE ISSUE: 















• The Confidentiality and Conduct sections of the ETHICS RULE. 
• Standards Rules such as l-2(a) and l-2(b); 7-2(a) and 7-2(b); and 9-2(a), which require an 
appraiser to identify the client, intended users, and intended use. 
• Standards Rules such as 2-l(a), 8-l(a), 10-l(a), which require an appraiser to clearly and 
accurately set forth the appraisal in a manner that is not misleading. 
• SCOPE OF WORK RULE, which requires an appraiser to ascertain whether other laws or 
regubtions apply to the assignment in addition to USPAP. 
• Statement on Appraisal Standards No. 9, which requires the appraiser to identify and disclose the 
client and intended users and the intended use in an appraisal, appraisal review, or appraisal 
consulting assignment. 
• Statement on Appraisal Standards No. 10, which describes applicability of USPAP in federally 
related transactions. 
• Advisory Opinion 25, which covers clarification of the client in a federally related transaction. 
• Advisory Opinion 27, which addresses appraising the same property for a new client. 
28 Comments 
29 No. Once a report has been prepared for a named client(s) and any other identified intended users and for an 
30 identified intended use, the appraiser cannot "readdress" (transfer) the report to another party. 
31 USP AP defines the Client as: 
32 The party or parties who engage an appraiser (by employment or contract) in a specific assignment 
33 (Bold added for emphasis). 
34 Assignment is defined as: 
35 A valuation service provided as a consequence of an agreement between an appraiser and a client 
36 (Bold added for emphasis). 
37 Intended Use is defined as: 
A-90 USPAP Advisory Opinions 2008-2009 Edition 
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ADVISORY OPINION 26 
38 the use or uses of an appraiser :S reported appraisal, appraisal review, or appraisal consulting 
39 assignment opinions and conclusions, as identlfied by the appraiser based on communication with the 
40 client at the time of the assignment (Bold added for emphasis). 
41 Intended User is defined as: 
42 the client and any other party as identified, by name or type, as users of the appraisal, appraisal 
43 review, or appraisal consulting report by the appraiser on the basis of communication with the client at 
44 the time of the assignment (Bold added for emphasis). 
45 Identification of the client, any other intended users, and the intended use are key elements in all assignments. 
46 Because th~se identifications drive the appraiser's scope of work decision, as well as other elements of the 
47 assignment, they must be determined at the time of the assignment. They cannot be modified after an 
48 assignment has been completed. See Statement on Appraisal Standards No. 9 for further clarification. 
49 Illustrations: 
50 Question # 1 
51 An appraiser was engaged by Client A to appraise a property. The appraiser delivered the appraisal report to 
52 Client A. The client has decided not to pursue the transaction that generated the need for the appraisal report. 
53 The appraiser is contacted by Client B. Client B requests that the original report be readdressed (transferred) by 
54 replacing Client A's name with Client B's name in the report. Is this acceptable? 
55 Answer: No. Simply changing the client name on the report cannot change or replace the original 
56 appraiser-client relationship that was established with Client A. Therefore, this action is misleading. 
57 Question #2 
58 How can this circumstance be handled according to Standards? 
59 Answer: The appraiser can consider Client B's request as a new assignment. In so doing, the appraiser may 
60 establish a new appraiser-client relationship with Client B and appraise the property for this new client. 
61 Important considerations, i.e., confidential information and other factors are further addressed in A0-27 -
62 "Appraising the Same Property for a New Client". 
63 Question #3 
64 Why might Client B want their name on the report that was completed for Client A? 
65 Answer: Client B may want to establish an appraiser-client relationship because it provides all the rights, 
66 obligations, and liabilities such a relationship places on the appraiser. 
67 A prudent method to establish an appraiser-client relationship is to have a written engagement letter or 
68 contract with any client at the time of the assignment. 
USPAP Advisory Opinions 2008-2009 Edition 
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APPRAISAL PMENT - CLIENT ISSUES 
Eventual receipt of a copy of an appraisal, appraisal review, or appraisal consulting report does not 
make the recipient an intended user. To be an intended user the recipient must have been 
identified as such by the appraiser. 
71. APPRAISAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY AS AUTHORIZED AGENT FOR A CLIENT 
Question: 
Response: 
I accept assignments from an Appraisal Management Company (AMC) that has informed 
me they are an authorized agent for the lenders they represent. The AMC does not want me 
to list their name as the client, and asks that I only list the name of the lender they are 
representing. USP AP says the appraiser's client is the party who engages the appraiser. Is it 
ethical to omit the AMC's name as the client on my reports? 
Yes. If the AMC is acting as a duly authorized agent for a lender, identifying only the lender as 
your client is acceptable. 
72. CLIENT CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED 
Question: 
Response: 
I was recently asked to perform an appraisal assignment but the individual that contacted 
my firm was not the client and indicated that the client could not be identified. Can I accept 
this assignment and comply with USP AP? 
No. Standards Rule 1-2 states, in part: 
In developing a real property appraisal, an appraiser must: 
(a) identifY the client and other intended users; ... 
This does not preclude a third party, acting as an agent for the client, from ordering the appraisal; 
however, the appraiser must be able to identify the client. Refer to STATEMENT No. 9, 
Identification of Intended Use and Intended Users, for further clarification. 
73. SUBSEQUENT USER REQUESTS A "RELIANCE LETTER" 
Question: 
Response: 
I delivered an appraisal report to my client. A week later, an entity other than one of the 
identified intended users contacted me and asked that I provide a "reliance letter," enabling 
them to rely on the appraisal report for their own investment use. My client says they have 
no problem with my doing that. Can I provide this entity with such a letter, even though I 
had not originally identified them as an intended user? 
No. You cannot add what is in effect a new "intended user" after the completion of an assignment, 
no matter what terminology you use. 
USPAP defines Intended User as: 
The client and any other party as identified, by name or type, as users of the appraisal, 
appraisal review, or appraisal consulting report by the appraiser on the basis of 
communication with the client at the time of the assignment. (Bold added for emphasis) 
FAQ 2008-2009 Edition 
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APPRAISAL DEVELOPMEf CLIENT ISSUES 
The proper way to handle this is to initiate a new assignment with this entity as the client and 
provide them an appraisal, being careful to develop an appropliate scope of work consistent with 
their own intended use. 
This new assignment could be based on virtually the same data and analysis, and the value 
conclusion might be the same. However, in the new assignment you must consider the assignment 
elements most appropriate to the scope of work for that client and the assignment, which could 
well be different from those of your prior client. 
74. READDRESS OR TRANSFER 
Question: 
Response: 
Is it acceptable to readdress or transfer a completed appraisal report? 
No. Once a repo1t has been prepared for a named client or clients, the appraiser cannot 'readdress' 
(transfer) the rep01t to another party. Simply changing the client name on the rep01t cannot change 
or replace the original appraiser-client relationship. Therefore, this action is misleading. 
However, you can consider the request as a new assignment. In so doing, you may establish a new 
appraiser-client relationship and appraise the property for this new client. 
Additional infonnation can be found in Advisory Opinion 26, Readdressing (Transferring) a 
Report to Another Party. Impo1tant considerations, such as the handling of confidential 
information and other factors, are addressed in Advisory Opinion 27, Appraising the Same 
Property for a New Client. 




I am aware of Advisory Opinions: A0-26, Readdressing (Transferring) a Report to Another 
Party and A0-27, Appraising the Same Property for a New Client. Does that guidance still 
apply if Lender A releases me to perform another assignment, or can I just readdress the 
report to Lender B since I have obtained a release? 
It is never permissible to "readdress" a report by simply changing the client's name on a 
completed repmt, regardless of whether the first client gave a release. The request from Lender B 
must be treated as a new assignment. 
Further guidance can be found in the Obtaining a Release section of Advisory Opinion 27. 
00237 
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Jeffrey M. Wilson, #1615 
Wilson & McColl 
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone: 208-345-9100 
Patrick J. Collins, #13046 
Collins & Coldwell, LLC 
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820 
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Telephone: 303-296-7700 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVl0-3993 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS WADE MASSEY AND 
CAPITOL WEST APPRAISALS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Plaintiff, CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc., by and through its undersigned counsel, 
files their reply to Defendant's Response (hereinafter, "Response") to Plaintiffs Motion 
for Reconsideration. In support thereof, Plaintiff submits as follows: 




It is an undisputed fact that Idahy Federal Credit Union (hereinafter, "Idahy") 
issued a check for $800 to Defendants Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals, as 
payment for the Appraisal of 16462 Plum Road. It is also an undisputed fact that 
Defendant Wade Massey (hereinafter, Massey), who is employed by Capitol West 
Appraisals and prepared the Appraisal, admitted in his deposition that he prepared a 
"defective appraisal." (See Massey Deposition at Pg. 10, Ln. 1-3). He admitted that his 
Appraisal "had ... errors that we were aware of..." (Id. at Pg. 10, Ln. 1-4) 
Massey recalled receiving payment of the $800 check from Idahy, yet he did not 
correct the "errors" or inform the credit union about the errors in his "defective" 
Appraisal. The $800 check, made payable to Capitol West Appraisals and A. Wade 
Massey and deposited into Massey's bank account, conclusively demonstrates that Idahy 
properly paid for the Appraisal and that the Defendants accepted payment for it. 
The Defendants' contention that this case could have been avoided with a "30 
second phone call" raises a more troubling question as to why Massey, as the alleged 
unintended recipient of the check, didn't call Idahy to inform them that the payment he 
received and accepted was for an admittedly "defective approval". At the time Massey 
accepted payment, he knew that he had a defective appraisal in the marketplace, and that 
Idahy possessed it. Yet Massey never communicated with Idahy, rather he quickly 
negotiated and deposited its check. 
The Defendants have continued to claim that the "check argument" is not new, 
nor unavailing. To the Defendants' dismay, the acceptance of the check is important and 
should not be disregarded or viewed in a faint light. Unassailably, the undisputed fact 
that the Defendants accepted the check, as payment for the appraisal he prepared, 
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logically destabilizes the alleged "undisputed facts" proposed by the Defense, and 
undermines the Court's Order of Summary Judgment. 
II. THE COURT RELIES ON DISPUTED FACTS 
The Court's conclusion that there is no evidence to show how Idahy came into 
possession of the Appraisal before discover has been complete is no reason for an entry 
of summary judgment against its subrogee. It is undisputed Idahy possessed Massey's 
appraisal, paid for it, and relied on it when approving a loan. Idahy paid for the Appraisal 
and the Defendants accepted payment knowing that the Appraisal contained false and 
inaccurate information. This evidence is clear that Idahy received the Appraisal in lieu of 
payment of $800. At the very least, the undisputed evidence creates a question of fact as 
to the circumstances surrounding how Idahy acquired the Appraisal. 
The Court, and certainly the defense, rely heavily on the deposition testimony of 
Idahy CEO (Connie Miller), who at the time of her deposition, stated" ... I'm not aware 
that we ever identified how we got the appraisal." This statement is not dispositive, 
justifying the entry of summary judgment before discovery has been completed, as Ms. 
Miller did testify that Idahy paid the Defendants for the Appraisal and relied upon it 
when approving the loan. 
The Defendants try to infer that the statement Ray Schlid (Massey's attorney) 
made to Ms. Miller, "[d]o you want your $800 bucks back?', is evidence that Massey 
wanted to return the check. However this assertion is factually false. After all of his 




The Defense contends that the Affidavit of appraiser Joe Huffman supports a 
position that payment does not give rise to the appraiser-client relationship. However, 
that is only opinion and not a fact. Either way, the opinion could hardly be viewed as 
dispositive on the issue of whether acceptance of payment for an "appraisal" gives rise to 
an appraiser-client relationship. 
What should be given more weight on this issue is the undisputed fact that the 
"Appraisal and Report Identification", which is signed by Massey and accompanies 
Defendants' Uniform Residential Appraisal Report, lists the Defendants' Appraisal as a 
"Swnmary" appraisal under USPAP Standard 2-2(b). Massey chose a "Summary" 
appraisal knowing that USP AP Standard 2-2(b) allows an "intended user" of an appraisal 
report to be identified as type, and also allows the client to distribute the report at the 
request of the borrower. As thoroughly indicated in the Plaintiffs Response to 
Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and in the 
Motion for Reconsideration, this language clearly creates a duty that Massey owes to any 
foreseeable user of the appraisal. In fact, the language ofUSPAP Standard 2-2(b) 
evidences that Idahy is a foreseeable user of Massey's appraisal. 
A jury would have ample evidence to find that Idahy was an "intended user" of 
Massey's appraisal. Further, it is obvious that the Defendants' owed a duty to Idahy as a 
reasonably foreseeable user of the appraisal. The fact that this issue is not being allowed 
to be submitted to the jury is erroneous. 




In its Order, the Court bases its conclusion and decision upon the undocumented 
Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca (hereinafter, the Menchaca Affidavit). The Order cites the 
Menchaca Affidavit, and the defense has continued to rely on the alleged affidavit of 
Menchaca throughout the proceedings. 
On August 18th, 2010, the Defense submitted to the Court and Plaintiff a 
Subpoena Duces Tecum, addressed to Clearwater Mortgage, Inc., c/o Ernie Menchaca. 
(See, attached as Exhibit A.) However the Defense sent a Notice of Vacating Records 
Deposition of Clearwater Mortgage, Inc. on August 25, 2010. (See, attached as Exhibit 
Ji, hereinafter "Notice".) Written in accordance with Rule 11, the Notice continues, 
"Defendants will reschedule the deposition for a later date and time." It is a fact that no 
deposition of Menchaca was ever rescheduled by Defendants and no deposition of 
Menchaca ever took place. In hindsight, it is clear why Defendants made such a 
misrepresentation to Plaintiff. 
In its Order, the Court addresses the fact that the Defendants relied on the 
Menchaca Affidavit despite their failure to file the document as an Exhibit, or record in 
the Register of Actions. (See, Order footnotes, Pg. 3). The Order states "At the hearing, 
the court confirmed that Plaintiff had timely received service of copy of the Menchaca 
Affidavit with the original motion papers and granted Defendants leave to file a copy 
after the hearing". In fact, Plaintiff did not receive a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit. 
Defendants filed a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit on February 9th, 2012, only 7 days 
before the court issued its Order on Motions of Summary Judgment. 
Defendants first relied on the alleged Menchaca Affidavit in their Motion for 
Summary Judgment (See, page 3). However Defendants never provided the Affidavit to 
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Plaintiffs, or to the Court. In a letter dated November 9, 2011, Defendants' Counsel 
describes the exhibits included with their Motion for Summary Judgment (See, attached 
as Exhibit C). The letter proves that Defendants withheld the production of the 
Menchaca Affidavit from Plaintiff at that time. 
The Defense also relies on the alleged Menchaca Affidavit in their Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Again, the Opposition failed to include any 
exhibit or record as to the Menchaca Affidavit. The letter accompanying the Motion 
from January 23, 2012 is evidence as such (See, attached Exhibit D). The letter proves 
that again, for a second time, Defendants withheld production of the Menchaca Affidavit 
from Plaintiff. 
Despite never producing the Menchaca Affidavit, as required by the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the Defense continued to rely on the alleged Menchaca Affidavit in 
motions and proceedings. It is a fact that the Defense noticed Menchaca to be deposed. 
It is also a fact that the Defense cancelled that deposition representing under Rule 11 that 
it would be rescheduled. How Mr. Menchaca's Affidavit ended up in the following 
proceedings is still up for question. If the Court based its Order upon the undocumented 
Affidavit of Menchaca, then it based its decision upon a document withheld from 
Plaintiff and never allowed to be tested in the discovery process. Unfortunately, it 
appears the court has assumed the Affidavit to be true and accurate, despite the fact that 
the Affidavit is directly contradicted by the Certification made by Massey in his 
Appraisal. 
Regardless of what Mr. Menchaca said in his affidavit, it is an undisputed fact that 
Wade Massey chose "Summary" appraisal on his certified appraisal form, fully knowing 
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the obligations that the specific choice entailed. At minimum, there presently exists a 
dispute, to be decided by a jury, as to whether Defendant's acceptance of payment 
supports a conclusion that Idahy was an "intended user" of Defendants' Appraisal. 
IV. LEGALSTANDARD 
As the Court is aware, the purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether 
a trial is necessary. White v. Sort Intern Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (101h Cir. 1995). 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thomson v. City of 
Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50, P.3d 488, 491 (2002). 
In this case, the Court's Order disregards that underlying facts are disputed and 
that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Idahy was entitled to use and 
rely upon the Appraisal after paying Defendants their fee for preparation of the Appraisal. 
The undisputed facts are that Idahy tendered payment to the Defendants, the Defendants 
accepted that payment, and the Defendants deposited that payment in their bank account. 
Further, the Defendants knowingly and purposefully prepared the Appraisal as a 
"Summary", thus creating a "reasonably foreseeable" plaintiff in Idahy. In light of these 
facts, at a minimum, an obvious reasonable inference would be that the Credit Union 
reasonably relied on an Appraisal for which it tendered payment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The fact that Ernie Menchaca has not yet been deposed 1 and that Defendants 
withheld production of his Affidavit to Plaintiff is of critical importance in this case. 
Neither the Court nor the Plaintiff received notice of his Affidavit until the Court 
1 The discovery cut off is 45 days prior to the August 201h trial date. 
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submitted it into the record on February 9, 2012. It is unfortunate that this was only 7 
days before the Court filed its Order for Summary Judgment in the case. 
The circumstances surrounding Ernie Menchaca's testimony in his Affidavit 
create important questions regarding the adequacy of the statements he provided. 
Importantly, it also creates doubts as to the key tenets of Defense's case, mainly the 
scope and use of the appraisal agreement between Massey and Clearwater Mortgage. So 
when the Court based its order off the alleged Menchaca Affidavit, it based its Order on 
disputed facts. 
The following facts are undisputed: 
• Massey accepted payment from Idahy for $800.00. 
• Payment was for the appraisal that Massey prepared. 
• In Massey's appraisal, he knowingly and purposefully selected a 
"summary" appraisal, not a "restricted use" agreement. 
• Massey signed the appraisal. 
• Specific terms in the appraisal indicated that Massey could be held liable 
to third parties under the agreement. 
• The appraisal was negligently prepared and Massey knew the appraisal 
was "defective". 
• Idahy justifiably relied on the appraisal, and damages of $250,000 
occurred due to the "defective" appraisal. 
In light of these undisputed facts it is apparent that the Court was in error when 
entering Summary Judgment on behalf of the Defendants. The undisputed facts as 
mentioned above, logically undermine the assertions made by Defendants. It is apparent 
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that Idahy was a foreseeable and intended user of Massey's appraisal. Further, by 
accepting payment for his appraisal services, Massey voluntarily assumed a duty to 
Plaintiff. As such, this is a case to be litigated in front of a jury. 
Accordingly, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court reconsider and 
vacate its Order granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and allow this 
Plaintiff to proceed to trial, allowing a jury to hold Massey liable for his "defective" 
appraisal. 
DATED this ~ay of April, 2012. 
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Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351 
John J. Browder, ISB #7531 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100 
PO Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701-0856 
Telephone: (208) 342-4300 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344 
2700.024\SDT Clearwater Mortgage. wpd 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF'THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, 
Defendants. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: 
YOU ARE COMMANDED: 
Case No. CVlO - 3993 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
Clearwater Mortgage, Inc. 
c/o Ernie Menchaca 
8517 W. Overland Road 
Boise, ID 83709 
[ ] To appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify in the above case. 
[ ] To appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify at the taking of a 
deposition in the above case. 
[ X] To produce or permit inspection and copying of the documents or objects attached 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM CLEARWATER MORTGAGE, INC. -1 
hereto as Exhibit "A," including electronically stored information, at the place, date 
and time specified below. 




Lopez & Kelly, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Ste. 100 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0856 
August 30, 2010 
9:30 a.m. 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or to 
produce or pennit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in contempt of 
court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS 
($100. 00) and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this Subpoena. 
DATED this I g day of August, 2010. 
LOPEZ & KELLY PLLC 
By:-jfil-/?-.f ?c. 
Zh;iE. Kelly, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM CLEARWATER MORTGAGE, INC. -2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HE?~B Y CERTIFY that on this~ day of August, 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated 
below, addressed as follows: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
WILSON & MCCOLL 
420 W. Washington 
PO Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345~9100 
Facsimile: (20&) 384-0442 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Patrick J. Collins 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
1801 Broadway, Suite 1203 
Denver, CO 80202 
Telephone: (303) 296-7700 
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160 















SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM CLEARWATER MORTGAGE, INC. -3 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
1. Your entire file, documents and/or tangible objects whethe in electronic form or tangible 
relating to Steven Hruza and Valerie H:ruza, including, without limitation, all emails, 
correspondence, unden:vriting notes and applications for ioans to be secured by the real property 
located at 16462 Plum Drive, Caldwell, Idaho 83607. 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM CLEARWATER MORTGAGE, INC. -4 
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Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351 
John J. Browder, ISB #7531 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100 
PO Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701-0856 
Telephone: (208) 342-4300 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344 
2700.024\Depo.Clearwater.vacatewpd.wpd 
Attorneys for Defendants ~ ~ ~r-.._,\"\ n i I {( }) 1 11 \ \, / 
\,s ~if'.:~ U' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVlO - 3993 
NOTICE OF VACATING RECORDS 
DEPOSITION OF CLEARWATER 
MORTGAGE, INC. 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, 
Lopez & Kelly, PLLC, hereby vacate the previously scheduled records deposition, set to commence on 
August 30, 2010, at 9:30 a.m. 
Defendants will reschedule the deposition for a later date and time. 
DATED this .2.£ day of August, 2010. 
NOTICE OF VACATING RECORDS DE ~ 
! 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
ael E. Kelly, Of the Firm 
ttorneys for Defendant Wade Massey 
EXHIBIT ER MORTGAGE, INC.- 1 
I'--~ 
251. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __ day of August, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated below, 
addressed as follows: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
WILSON & MCCOLL 
420 W. Washington 
PO Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-9100 
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Patrick J. Collins 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
700 17th St., Suite 1820 
Denver, CO 80202 
Telephone: (303) 296-7700 
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160 
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THOMAS H. LOPEZ 
MICHAELE. KELLY 
Lou PICCIONI 
JOHN J. BROWDER 
NATHANS. OHLER 
Clerk of the District Court 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
LOPEZ & KELLY PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
WITH A ITORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO 
OREGON, NEW YORK & ARIZONA 
November 9, 2011 
RE: Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey, et al. 
Dear Clerk: 
Canyon County Case No. CVlO - 3993 
Our File No. 2700.024 
413 W. IDAHO STREET 
SUITE 100 
POBox856 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
TELEPHONE (208) 342-4300 
FACSIMILE (208) 342-4344 
www.idahodefense.com 
Please find enclosed with this letter an original and one copy of the following: 
I. Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Motion for Summary Judgment; 
2. Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
3. Affidavit of Wade Massey; 
4. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' 
Motion for Summary Judgment; and 
5. Notice of Hearing. 
Please file the originals, conform the copies, and return the conformed copies to this office. 
I have enclosed a self-addressed, postage prepaid envelope for your convenience. 
Thank you for your assistance in this matter. 
MEK/ts 
Enclosures 
c: Jeffrey M. Wilson, w/enclosure 
Patrick J. Collins, w/enclosure 
Clerk08. wpd 
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THOMAS H. LOPEZ 
MJCHAELE. KELLY 
JOHN J. BROWDER 
NATHANS. OHLER 
Clerk of the District Court 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
LOPEZ & KELLY PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
WITH ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO 
OREGON, NEW YORK & ARIZONA 
January 23, 2012 
RE: Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey, et al. 
Dear Clerk: 
Canyon County Case No. CVIO - 3993 
Our File No. 2700.024 
413 W. IDAHO STREET 
SUITE 100 
PO Box 856 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
TELEPHONE (208) 342-4300 
FACSTh1ILE (208) 342-4344 
www.idahodefense.com 
Please find enclosed with this letter an original and one copy of the following: 
1. Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment; 
2. Affidavit of Joe Huffman; and 
3. Second Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants Massey and Capitol West 
Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Please file the originals, conform the copies, and return the conformed copies to this office. 
I have enclosed a self-addressed, postage prepaid envelope for your convenience. 
Thank you for your assistance in this matter. 
ME Kits 
Enclosures 
c: Jeffrey M. Wilson, w/enclosure 
Patrick J. Collins, w/enclosure 
Clerk09. wpd 
v;?~ 
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Jeffrey M. Wilson, #1615 
Wilson & McColl 
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200 
Boise, ID 83703 
'felephone; 208-345-9100 
Patrick J Collins,# 13046 
Collins & Coldwell, LLC 
7 00 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820 
Denver, CO B0202 
Telephone: 303-296-7700 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
No.2110 P. 117 
APR i 0 
CANYON COUNTY 
T. CRAWFORD, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 1HE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR Tiffi COUNTY OF CANYON 
INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., 
vs. 
VlADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
P..PPRA1SALS, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVI0-3993 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW Plaintiff CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc., by and through its counsel, 
Collins & Coldwell, LLC, and hereby submits its Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for 
Ri:conside:ra.tion. 
TIIELAWSUJT 
Plaintiff's cause of action is against a real estate appraiser and his employer. In its 
Complaint, Plamti:ff alleges that the appraiser breached duties owed in providing services. 
Plaintiff seeks damages for economic loss. Defendants are accused of negligence in the 
pr. ill. LVIL i:LOrlVI Wilson Mccoll No.2110 P. 2/7 
preparation of an A.ppraisal and for over~appraising a property by approximately one half million 
aclfots. Defondant Wade Massey; under oathi has admitted to doing so and characterized his 
appraisal as "defective.'' When the borrowers/property owners defaulted on their real estate-
secured loan with Plaintiffs subrogee, Icon Federal Credit Union, the property was not worth the 
value of the mortgage kian and Icon Federal Credit Union suffered a $268,339.61 loss. 
CONTROLLING LAW 
1. flRRBA 
The applicable controlling law to our fact pattern is the Financial Institutions Reform) 
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Title XI, 12 U.S.C. §3331> et seq. The 
purpose of FIRREA is to ensure that real estate appraisals are conducted in accordance with 
uni form standards, These standards require that all appraisals be performed in writing by 
individuals whose competency has been established and whose conduct will be supervised 
effectively. FIR.REA established an Appraisal Standards Board to provide these guidelines, 
which were then promulgated as the Unifonn Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. 
The Uniform Stai.1dards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USP AP) guidelines are 
published annually. The guidelines are divided into Definitions, Preamble, Rules, Standards and 
Standards Rules (which include comments), and the Statements on Appraisal Standards. The 
core principle embodied in USP Af' guidelines is found in Standards Rule 1~1 is as follows: 
* * -It 
In developing a real property appraisal~ an appraiser must: 
a) be aware of, understand, a_nd correctly em.ploy those recognized methods and 
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b) not commit a substantial error of omission or commission that significantly 
3.ffects an appraisal; and 
* * * 
c) not render 'appraisal services in a careless or negligent manner, such as by making 
a series of errors that, although individually might not significantly affect the 
results of an appraisa11 in the aggregate affect the credibility of those results. 
In Idaho, the Real Estate Appraisers Act (§54-4101) governs the administrative 
regulation of all appraisers licensed in accordance \.Vith FIRREA. In Idaho, the Act includes the 
term ''appraisal assignment," which is defined in §54-4101 as: 
(2) "Appraisal assignment" means an engagement for which an appraiser 
is employed or retained to act, or would be perceived by third parties or the 
public as aeting, as a disinterested third party in rendering an unbiased opinion or 
conclusion relating to the value, nature, quality or utility of specified interested in, 
or aspect of} identified real estate. [Emphasis on third-party reliance added.] 
\}/hile USPAP does not require that a real estate appraisal be perfect, it does establish a 
standard that requires an appraiser to use diligence and due care in fonnulating a market 
valuation and not render services in a careless or negligent manner. See Private Mortgage 
Investment Services, Inc. v. Hotel & Club Associates, Inc., 296 F.3d 308, 315 (4th Cir. 2002) (it 
is failure to exercise due care that allows for claim against real estate appraiser). 
Numerous courts have upheld negligent misrepresentation and professional malpractice 
claims against real estate appraisers in. connection with defective appraisals. For example, 
appraiser liable to third party for negligent misrepresentation, Superior Bank, F.S.B. v. Tandem 
National ivfortgage, 111c., 197 F.Supp.2d 298, 311 (D.Md. 2000); economic-loss doctrine did not 
repurchaser's negligent misrepresentation claim against appraiser, First Federal Savings & 
Loan Association of Rochester v. Charter Appraisal Co., 247 Conn. 597> 724 A.2d 497 (1999); 
affirming fmding for plaintiff when appraiser overvalued real property and bank relied on 
appraisal, Bolser v. Clark, 110 Wn.App. 895, 43 PJd 62; 65 (2002); Fisher v. Comer Plantation, 
3 
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Inc., 772 So.2d 455, 462 (Ala. 2000); Schaaf v. Highfield, 127 Wn.2d 17, 896 P.2d 665, 668-669 
(1995); First State Savings Bank v. Albright & Associates of Ocala, Inc., 561 So.2d 1326, 1329 
(Fla.App. 1990)i holding real estate appraiser may be liable to third parties for negligent 
misrepresentation, overruled on other grounds by Garden v. Frier, 602 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 1992); 
v. Neimon, 123 Wis.2d 410, 366 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Wis.App 1985); real estate appraiser 
liable to third parties not in privity for negligent misrepresentation, Larsen v. United 
Federal Savings & Loan Association of Des Moines, 300 N. W.2d 281, 289 (Iowa 1981 ). 
2. DUTY TO EXERCISE ORDINARY CARE 
As a general principle, every person, in the conduct of his or her business, has a duty to 
exercise ordinary care to p:reveni unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others. Sharp v. 
WH Moore inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 P.2d 506 (1990). 
In determining whether a duty will arise in a particular context, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has identified several factors to consider. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247, 985 P.2d 669 
(1999). The factors include the foreseeability of hann to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that 
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and 
mJUJ7 the moral blarne attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing 
future hann, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of 
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and 
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Id.; Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846, 908 P .2d 
143, 148 (1995). Where the degree or result of hann is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a 
l'e!arively kw; degree offoreseeabilit'; is required. Turpen, 985 P.2d at 673. 
4 
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3. RULE 56 
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), 
vrhich is identical in aJl relevant aspect to I.R.C.P. 56(c)> stated: 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entcy of summary 
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party 
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's cse, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof 
at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material 
fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 
nonmovnillg party's case necessarily renders all other facts m-immaterial. The 
moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" because the non.moving 
party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case 
·with respect to which she has the burden of proof.· [Emphasis added.] 
Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 3171 322~23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 
273 (1986) (cirations omitted). The language and reasoning in. Celotex has been adopted in 
Idaho. Dunnickv. Elder, 126 Idaho 3081 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct App. 1994). 
DATED frris f~dny of April, 2012. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
A(!,{ f;,~ 
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CANYON COUNTY 061,';RK 
K CANO, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
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In this action, Plaintiff asserts claims for professional negligence, negligent 
misrepresentation, and breach of contract based upon Defendant's alleged negligence in 
preparing an appraisal on certain real property located in Canyon County. Plaintiff alleges that 
Idahy Federal Credit Union, now known as Icon Credit Union, relied on the appraisal in 
approving a loan to Steven and Valerie Hruza secured by a second mortgage on the property. 
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The factual allegations of the Complaint are set forth in the court's February 17, 2012 
Order on Motions for Summary Judgment. In that Order, the court granted Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims for Negligent Misrepresentation and 
Breach of Contract, based on the determination that such claims were not viable, as a matter of 
law, based upon existing Idaho precedent and the facts alleged, and Plaintiffs Negligence 
claim, based upon the absence of a duty, recognized by law, running from Defendants to 
Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration of the court's determination granting summary 
judgment on its Negligence claim. 
After reviewing the parties' submissions and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(D), the court 
determines that it does not require oral argument to determine the issues raised on the instant 
motion. Plaintiff does not rely on any new evidence in support of its motion, but, instead, 
asserts that the court misapprehended or misapplied the applicable law in reaching its 
determination. 
I. Legal Standard 
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory order of the trial court may be made at 
any time before the entry of final judgment or within fourteen days after entry of judgment. 
I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B). 
The decision whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration generally rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Spur Products v. Stoel Rives, LLP, 143 Idaho 812, 815, 153 
P.3d 1158, 1161 (2007). In making a discretionary determination, this court must: (1) correctly 
perceive the issue as discretionary; (2) act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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consistently with the applicable legal standards and choices available to the court; and (3) reach 
its decision by an exercise ofreason. Id., 143 Idaho at 817, 153 P.3d at 1163. 
II. Analysis 
On its motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff asserts that the court erred in granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing its Negligence claim because: (1) "the 
court has usurped the function of a jury by making factual findings in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants;" and (2) the "Court erroneously concludes that the standard 
of care was not 1::-reached because the Appraisal was not a 'report' that Idahy FCU was 
authorized to rely upon when making a mortgage loan to the Hruzas." 
A. Duty 
As the court explained in its Order, a party asserting a claim for negligence must prove: 
( 1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of 
conduct; (2) breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and 
damage/injury to the plaintiff; and (4) actual loss or damage. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi 
Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999). 
The question of whether a duty exists is one oflaw. Id., 133 Idaho at 400, 987 P.2d at 
312. 
Plaintiff has not adduced any Idaho authority indicating that the above is an incorrect 
statement of the applicable law. 
After reviewing the evidence before it, the court determined that Defendants made a 
primafacie showing that Defendants assumed no duty, recognized by law, to Plaintiff and that 
Plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to demonstrate the existence of such a duty. Based on this 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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dismissing Plaintiff's Negligence claim for lack of duty, recognized by law, running from 
Defendants to Plaintiff. The court adheres to its determination, for the reasons set forth in the 
Order. 
In addition, in light of the fact that the question of the existence of a duty is a matter of 
law for the court, it is unclear to the court how it usurped the function of a jury by determining 
the issue of duty on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
B. Standard of Care 
In light of its determination that there was no enforceable duty running from Defendants 
to Plaintiffs, the court did not reach the issue of whether Defendants breached any potentially 
applicable standard of care. 
II. Menchaca Affidavit 
In its Reply, Plaintiff contends that the court erred in relying on the Affidavit of Ernie 
Menchaca in making its determination because, "[I]f the Court based its Order upon the 
undocumented Affidavit of Menchaca, then it based its decision upon a document withheld from 
Plaintiff and never allowed to be tested in the discovery process." 
In a footnote to its Order, the court specifically noted: "In preparing for the hearing on 
the instant motions, it became clear to the court that Defendants were relying on the Menchaca 
Affidavit in support of their Motion. However, the court could not locate that Affidavit in the 
file and there was no record of the Affidavit in the Register of Actions. At the hearing, the court 
confirmed that Plaintiffs had timely received service of a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with 
the original motion papers and granted Defendants leave to file a copy after the hearing. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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Defendants filed a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit on February 9, 2012." In its Reply, Plaintiff 
asserts, that "in fact, Plaintiff did not receive a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit. Defendants filed 
a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit on February 91h, 2012, only 7 days before the court issued its 
Order on Motions for Summary Judgment." The author of Plaintiffs Reply1 omits the fact that 
the court raised this specific issue with counsel for both parties at the outset of the hearing, 
Plaintiffs counsel specifically acknowledged receipt of the Menchaca Affidavit and graciously 
stipulated to permit Defendants' counsel to augment the record to include the Menchaca 
Affidavit. The court directed Defendants' counsel to file a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with 
the court to ensure that it appeared in the court's records, because Defendants relied on the 
Affidavit in different portions of the motions before the court. Defendants filed the Affidavit on 
February 9, 2012, the same day as the hearing on the parties' motions. It is well-established in 
this state that stipulations of parties or counsel made in pending proceedings are conclusive as to 
all matters properly contained or included therein. See Workman Family Partnership v. City of 
Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 35, 655 P.2d 926, 929 (1982). 
To the extent Plaintiff asserts that it required additional time to secure evidence sufficient 
to respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the proper course of action was to 
make an application pursuant to I.R.C.P 56(f). Plaintiff failed to make such an application and 
still has not made such an application. 
1 It appears that Plaintiff's submissions on the instant motion, including the Reply, were not authored by counsel 
who appeared on Plaintiffs behalf at the hearing on the motions for summary judgment. 




Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
/.n~ 
Dated this _j_/L_day of April, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the 
following, either by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid; by hand delivery; by courthouse 
basket; or by facsimile copy: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson & McColl 
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Facsimile: 208-384-0442 
John J. Browder 
Lopez & Kelly, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100 
P.O. Box 856 
Boise, Idaho 83 70 I 
Facsimile: 208-342-4344 
Patrick J. Collins 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
Facsimile: 303-295-7160 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO 
Clerk of the District Court 
















TIME : 04/10/2012 15:03 
~~AME : CA~.JYON COUNTY COURTS 
FAX : 2084547525 
TEL : 
SER.#: 000L9J473711 
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APR l ll 2012 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
K CANO, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., 
Plaintiff~ 
vs. 
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NAME : CANYON COUNTY COURTS 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
K CANO. DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL D.ISTRJCT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
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In this action, Plaintiff asserts claims for professional negligence, negligent 
Jeffrey M. Wilson, #1615 
Wilson & McColl 
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone: 208-345-9100 
Patrick J. Collins, #13046 
Collins & Coldwell, LLC 
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820 
Denver, CO 80202 
Telephone: 303-296-7700 
Attorneys for Plcfatiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. CVl0-3993 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION 
PURSUANT TO RULE 56(f) AND RENEWED MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE 
COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
NOW COMES Plaintiff, CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc., by and through its undersigned 
counsel, requests that this honorable Court permit the taking of the deposition of Ernie Menchaca 
pursuant to Rule 56(f). In support thereof, Plaintiff asserts as follows: 
1. On February 16, 2012, this Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and entered an Order dismissing Plaintiffs claims. 
0 2'7 
2. On March 15, 2012, this Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants and 
dismissed with prejudice all claims against Defendants. The Court also agreed to consider the 
issue of costs and attorney fees pursuant to Rule 54 and a hearing is currently set for May 10, 
2012. 
3. The Court, on April 10, 2012, entered an Order summarily denying Plaintiffs 
Motion for Reconsideration without a hearing that was scheduled for April 11, 2012. The 
Court's Order stated: 
II. Menchaca Affidavit 
In its Reply, Plaintiff contents that the court erred in relying on the 
Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca in making its determination because, "[I]f the Court 
based its Order upon the undocumented Affidavit of Menchaca, then it based its 
decision upon a document withheld from Plaintiff and never allowed to be tested 
in the discovery process." 
In a footnote to its Order, the Court specifically noted: "In preparing for 
the hearing on the instant Motions, it became clear to the Court that Defendants 
were relying on the Menchaca Affidavit in support of their Motion. However, the 
Court could not locate that Affidavit in the file and there was no record of the 
Affidavit in the Register of Actions. At the hearing, the Court confirmed that 
Plaintiff had timely received service of a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with the 
original Motion papers and granted Defendants leave to file a copy after the 
hearing. Defendants filed a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit on February 9, 
2012." In its Reply, Plaintiff asserts that "in fact, Plaintiff did not receive a copy 
of the Menchaca Affidavit. Defendants filed a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit on 
February 9, 2012, only seven days before the Court issued its Order on Motions 
for Summary Judgment." The author of Plaintiffs Reply1omits the fact that the 
Court raised this specific issued with counsel for both parties at the outset of the 
hearing. Plaintiffs counsel specifically acknowledged receipt of the Menchaca 
Affidavit and graciously stipulated to permit Defendants' counsel to augment the 
record to include the Menchaca Affidavit. The Court directed Defendants' 
counsel to file a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with the Court to ensure that it 
appeared in the Court's records, because Defendants relied on the Affidavit in 
different portions of the Motions before the Court. Defendants filed the Affidavit 
on February 9, 2012, the same day as the hearing on the parties' Motions. It is 
well established in this State that stipulations of parties or counsel made in 
pending proceedings are conclusive as to all matters properly contained or 
1 It appears that Plaintiffs submission on the instant Motion, including the Reply, were not authored by counsel who 
appeared on Plaintiffs behalf at the hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment. 
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included therein. See Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 
Idaho 32, 35, 655 P.2d 926, 929 (1982). 
To the extent Plaintiff asserts that it required additional time to secure 
evidence sufficient to respond to Defendants' Motion for Summa.Ty Judgment, the 
proper course of action was to make an application pursuant to IR.C.P. 56(f). 
Plaintiff failed to make such an application and still has not made such an 
application. 
4. The Court was correct in finding that Plaintiff did not receive a copy of the 
Menchaca Affidavit and that I.R.C.P. 56(f) specifically provides that the Court can deny a 
summary judgment or grant a continuance to permit the taking of a deposition. Rule 56(£) states: 
When affidavits·are unavailable in summary judgment proceedings. 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
5. The Court's Order is incorrect in the statement that counsel at the hearing 
"acknowledge receipt of the Menchaca Affidavit." In fact, no counsel for Plaintiff as of this date 
has received a copy of the Affidavit (see Affidavits of Patrick J. Collins and Jeffrey M. Wilson, 
attached hereto as Exhibits A and B, respectively). 
6. In its Order, the Court bases its conclusion and decision upon the undocumented 
Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca. The Order cites the Menchaca Affidavit and the defense has 
continued to rely on the alleged Affidavit of Menchaca even though it has never been provided to 
opposing counsel. 
7. On August 18, 2010, the defense submitted to the Court and Plaintiff a Subpoena 
Duces Tecum addressed to Clearwater Mortgage, Inc., c/o Ernie Menchaca (see attached 
Exhibit C). However, the defense sent a Notice of Vacating Records Deposition of Clearwater 
Mortgage, Inc. on August 25, 2010 (see attached Exhibit D, hereinafter, "Notice"). Written in 
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accordance with Rule 11, the Notice continues, "Defendants will reschedule the deposition for a 
later date and time." It is a fact that no deposition of Menchaca was ever rescheduled by 
Defendants and no deposition of Menchaca ever took place. Instead, Defendants relied upon use 
of an ex parte affidavit at the summary judgment hearing. 
8. In its Order, the Court addresses the fact that the Defendants relied on the 
Menchaca Affidavit despite their failure to file the document as an exhibit or record it in the 
Register of Actions (see Order footnotes, pg. 3). The Order states, "At the hearing, the Court 
confirmed that Plaintiff had timely received service of [a] copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with 
the original Motion papers and granted Defendants leave to file a copy after the hearing." In 
fact, Plaintiff did not receive a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit. 
9. Defendants first relied on the alleged Menchaca Affidavit in their Motion for 
Summary Judgment (see pg. 3). However, the Defendants never provided the Menchaca 
Affidavit to Plaintiff or to the Court. In a letter, dated November 9, 2011, Defendants' counsel 
describes the Exhibits included with their Motion for Summary Judgment (see attached Exhibit 
E). The letter proves that Defendants failed to produce or deliver the Menchaca Affidavit from 
Plaintiff at that time. 
10. The defense also relied on the Menchaca Affidavit in their Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Again, the Opposition failed to include the Affidavit 
as an exhibit or make it part of the record. The letter accompanying the Motion from January 23, 
2012 is evidence as such (see attached Exhibit F). The letter provides that again, for a second 
time, Defendants failed to produce or deliver the Menchaca Affidavit from Plaintiff at that time. 
11. Regardless of what Mr. Menchaca stated in his Affidavit, it is an undisputed fact 
that Wade Massey chose "Summary" appraisal on his certified Appraisal form, fully knowing the 
4 
obligations that the specific choice entailed. At minimum, there presently exists a dispute to be 
decided by a jury as to whether Defendants' acceptance of payment supports a conclusion that 
Idahy was an "intended user" of Defendants' Appraisal. 
12. The discovery cut off date is 45 days prior to the August 20th trial date and there 
is ample time to complete discovery if the Court permits the deposition and stays the entry of 
judgment. The circumstances surrounding Ernie Menchaca's testimony in his Affidavit create 
important questions regarding the adequacy of the statements he provided. Importantly, it also 
creates doubts as to the key tenets of the defense's case, mainly the scope and use of the appraisal 
agreement between Massey and Clearwater Mortgage. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court stay the Judgment in this case, 
permit the deposition of Ernie Menchaca, and reconsider and vacate its Order granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and allow this Plaintiff to proceed to trial, allowing 
a jury to determine whether Massey is liable for his admittedly "defective" Appraisal. 
DATED this _/j_ day of April, 2012. Respectfully submitted, 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned.hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION 
TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO 
RULE 56(f) AND RENEWED MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT'S ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JTJDGMENT has been tra.11smitted as indicated below this ti day 
of April, 2012, to the following: 
Michael E. Kelly 
John J. Browder 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
P.O. Box 856 
B~ise, IP~ 701 j , 
Via: --~ __ .M,,o;j 
I 
Jeffrey M. Wilson, #1615 
Wilson & McColl 
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200 




Jeffrey M. Wilson, #1615 
Wilson & McColl 
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone: 208-345-9100 
Patrick J. Collins, #13046 
Collins & Coldwell, LLC 
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820 
Denver, CO 80202 
Telephone: 303-296-7700 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVI0-3993 
AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICK J. COLLINS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO 
RULE 56(f) AND RECONSIDER THE COURT'S ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PA TRICK J. COLLINS, being first duly sworn under oath, states as follows: 
1. That I am one of the Counsel for Plaintiff. 
2. That I make this Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Permit the 
Taking of Ernie Menchaca' s Depostion Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and to Reconsider the 
Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment. 
3. That I make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge and review. 
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4. That attached to this Affidavit and marked as Exhibit "A" and "B" are copies 
of correspondence from Defense Counsel to the Clerk of the District Court of Canyon 
County, dated November 9, 2011, and November 23, 2011. Neither Exhibits, "A" or 
"B", make referenc~ to an Affidavit, specifically "The Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca". 
5. That based on personal knowledge and review, Affiant, did not receive a copy 
of the Menchaca Affidavit, and still does not have a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit as of 
today's date. 
6. Plaintiffs counsel disagrees with the Court's assertion in its Order granting 
Defendants' request for Summary Judgment, which stated, "At the hearing, the Court 
confirmed that Plaintiff had timely received service of copy of the Menchaca Affidavit 
with the original Motion papers ... " 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this~ day of April, 2012. 
STATE OF COLORADO ) 
)ss 
COUNTY OF DENVER ) 
J. Collins, #13046 
. ~~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this Rday of April, 2011. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /9 day of April, 2012, I mailed and faxed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICK C. COLLINS IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION by regular United States mail with 
correct postage affixed thereon addressed to: 
John J. Browder 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100 
PO Box 856 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: 208-342-4344 
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THOMAS H. LOPEZ 
MICHAELE. KELLY 
Lou PICCIONI 
JOHN J. BROWDER 
NATHANS. OHLER 
Clerk of the District Court 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
LOPEZ & KELLY PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
WITH ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO 
OREGON, NEW YORK & ARIZONA 
November 9, 2011 
RE: Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey, et al. 
Dear Clerk:· 
Canyon County Case No. CVIO - 3993 
Our File No. 2700.024 
413 W. IDAHO STREET 
SUITE 100 
PO Box 856 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
TELEPHONE (208} 342-4300 
FACSIMILE (208) 342-4344 
www.idahodefense.com 
Please find enclosed with this letter an original and one copy of the following: 
1. Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Motion for Summary Judgment; 
2. Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
3. Affidavit of Wade Massey; 
4. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' 
Motion for Summary Judgment; and 
5. Notice of Hearing. 
Please file the originals, conform the copies, and return the conformed copies to this office. 
I have enclosed a self-addressed, postage prepaid envelope for your convenience. 
Thank you for your assistance in this matter. 
ME.Kits 
Enclosures 
c: Jeffrey M. Wilson, w/enclosure 







THOMAS H. LOPEZ 
MICHAELE. KELLY 
JOHN J. BROWDER 
NATHANS. OHLER 
Clerk of the District Court 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
LOPEZ & KELLY PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
WITH ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO 
OREGON, NEW YORK & ARIZONA 
January 23, 2012 
RE: Cum.is Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey, et al. 
Dear Clerk: 
Canyon County Case No. CVIO - 3993 
Our File No. 2700.024 
413 W. IDAHO STREET 
SUITE 100 
PO Box 856 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
TELEPHONE (208) 342-4300 
FACSIMILE (208) 342-4344 
www.idahodefense.com 
Please find enclosed with this letter an original and one copy of the following: 
1. Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment; 
2. Affidavit of Joe Huffman; and 
3. Second Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants Massey and Capitol West 
Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Please file the originals, conform the copies, and return the conformed copies to this office. 
I have enclosed a self-addressed, postage prepaid envelope for your convenience. 
Thank you for your assistance in this matter. 
MEK/ts 
Enclosures 
c: Jeffrey M. Wilson, w/enclosure 
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JEFFREY M. WILSON, ISB No. 1615 
CHRISTOPHER R. MOORE, ISB No. 8772 
WILSON & MCCOLL 
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200 
Boise, Idaho 83 703 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: 208-345-9100 
Facsimile: 208-384-0442 
PATRICK J. COLLINS, Atty. Reg. No. 13046 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820 
Denver, CO. 80202 
Telephone: 303-296-7700 
Facsimile: 303-295-7160 
Attorneys for Plaintiff CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AN FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 










STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
: SS. 
County of Ada. ) 
CASE NO. CVlO - 3993 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY M. WILSON 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PERMIT 
THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA 
DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO RULE 
56(f) AND RECONSIDER THE COURT'S 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
JEFFREY M. WILSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That I am one of the Counsel for Plaintiff. 
2. That I make this Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Permit the Taking of Ernie 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY M. WILSON IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION 
PURSUANT TO RULE 56(F) AND TO RECONSIDER THE 
COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
0281. 
Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(£) and to Reconsider the Comi's Order Granting 
Summary Judgment. 
3. That I make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge. 
4. That attached to this Affidavit and marked as Exhibit "A" and "B" are copies of 
correspondence from Defense Counsel to the Clerk of the District Court of Canyon County, dated 
November 9, 2011, and November 23, 2011. Neither Exhibits, "A" or "B", make reference to an 
Affidavit, specifically "The Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca". 
5. That your Affiant is aware of the Courts Order on Motions for Summary Judgment where 
it states in footnote one (1) at page three (3) "At the hearing the Court confinned that Plaintiffs had 
timely received service of the copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with the original Motion papers, and 
granted Defendants leave to file a copy after the hearing". While your Affiant agreed to allow 
Defense Counsel to file a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with the Court, your Affiant was mistaken, 
and was not aware that neither your Affiant' s office nor the office of Co-Counsel had received a copy 
of the Ernie Menchaca Affidavit at the time Defendant filed his Motion for Summary Judgment. 
6. That I have thoroughly reviewed my file materials, kept and maintained in my office in 
conjunction with this case, and do not have a copy of the Ernie Menchaca Affidavit as of the date of 
this Affidavit. 
7. That given the Courts reliance in part upon the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca in making its 
rnling upon the Motions for Summary Judgment, it would appear appropriate to allow Plaintiff an 
opportunity to respond to its contents. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY M. WILSON IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION 
PURSUANT TO RULE 56(F) AND TO RECONSIDER THE 
COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY illDGMENT - 2 
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FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this J_g day of April, 2012. 
John J. Browder 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100 
PO Box 856 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: 208-342-4344 
Patrick J. Collins 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
Facsimile: 303-295-7160 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY M. WILSON IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION 
PURSUANT TO RULE 56(F) AND TO RECONSIDER THE 
COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
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THOMAS H. LOPEZ 
MICHAELE. KELLY 
Lou PICCIONI 
JOHN J. BROWDER 
NATHANS. OHLER 
Clerk of the District Court 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
LOPEZ & KELLY PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
WITH ATTOJU-IEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO 
OREGON, NEW YORK & ARIZONA 
November 9, 2011 
RE: Cuniis Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey, et al. 
Dear Clerk: 
Canyon County Case No. CVIO - 3993 
Our File No. 2700.024 
413 W. IDAHO STREET 
SUITE 100 
PO Box 856 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
TELEPHONE (208) 342-4300 
FACSIMILE (208) 342-4344 
www.idahodefense.com 
Please find enclosed with this letter an original and one copy of the following: 
1. Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Motion for Summary Judgment; 
2. Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
3. Affidavit of Wade Massey; 
4. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' 
Motion for Summary Judgment; and 
5. Notice of Hearing. 
Please file the originals, conform the copies, and return the conformed copies to this office. 
I have enclosed a self-addressed, postage prepaid envelope for your convenience. 
Thank you for your assistance in this matter. 
ME Kits 
Enclosures 
c: Jeffrey M. Wilson, w/enclosure 






THOMAS H. LOPEZ 
MICHAELE. KELLY 
JOHN J. BROWDER 
NATHANS. OHLER 
Clerk of the District Court 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
LOPEZ & KELLY PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
WITH ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO 
OREGON, NEW YORK & ARIZONA 
January 23, 2012 
RE: Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey, et al. 
Dear Clerk: 
Canyon County Case No. CVIO - 3993 
Our File No. 2700.024 
413 W. IDAHO STREET 
SUITE 100 
PO Box 856 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
TELEPHONE (208) 342-4300 
FACSIMILE (208) 342-4344 
www.idahodefense.com 
Please find enclosed with this letter an original ai1d one copy of the following: 
1. Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment; 
2. Affidavit of Joe Huffman; and 
3. Second Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants Massey and Capitol West 
Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Please file the originals, conform the copies, and return the conformed copies to this office. 
I have enclosed a self-addressed, postage prepaid envelope for your convenience. 
Thank you for your assistance in this matter. 
ME Kits 
Enclosures 
c: Jeff~ey M. Wiluv.n.-µr~qJ.<elpsm:e 
Patnck J. CollM~vfenctcb.:M · 
Clerk09.wpd 
v;?~ 




JAN ? iii 2·.11,, • ( I ~IJ.Z 
W!Lsorv & Mr-r'"' , 
Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351 
John J. Browder, ISB #7531 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100 
PO Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701-0856 
Telephone: (208) 342-4300 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344 
2700.024\Aff of Counsel in Supp of Opposition to Motion to Permit Depo & Renewed Mot to Reconsider.wpd 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, 
Defendants. 
ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CVlO - 3993 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS 
MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE 
MENCHACA DEPOSITION 
PURSUANT TO RULE 56(F) AND 
RENEWED MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
I, Michael E. Kelly, being first sworn, do hereby depose and state as follows: 
1. That I am a member of the firm Lopez & Kelly, PLLC, and one of the attorneys representing 
Defendants WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST APPRAISALS in the above-captioned lawsuit. As 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO RULE 56(F) 
AND RENEWED MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I 
such, I am familiar with the facts and circumstances of this case and make this affidavit based upon my 
own personal knowledge; 
2. That attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Defendants' Answers to 
Plaintiff's First Set oflnterrogatories. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
DA TED this _\ day of May, 2012. 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
By:~--~~---~~~~~~~­
Michael E. K Ily, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me a notary public t.his fzst day of May, 2012. 
~A.Q.~1~S[Q1/1yUJ~ 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: Boise, ID ~ 
My Commission Expires: U - (o - I (_p 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO RULE 56(F) 
AND RENEWED MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
000287 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this_\_ day of May, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated below, 
addressed as follows: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
WILSON & MCCOLL 
420 W. Washington 
PO Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-9100 
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Patrick J. Collins 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
700 17th St., Suite 1820 
Denver, CO 80202 
Telephone: (303) 296-7700 
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160 
















AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO RULE 56(F) 




Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351 
John J. Browder, ISB #7531 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100 
PO Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701-0856 
Telephone: (208) 342-4300 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344 
2700.024\Ans. to Rogs.wpd. 
Attorneys for Defendants LJ ( 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., Case No. CVlO - 3993 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Lopez & Kelly, PLLC, 
and answers Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: State the name, address and telephone number of all 
employees and/or agents involved in the transactions and events which are the subject matter of the 
pleadings or who may have know ledge of the facts relevant to this lawsuit. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1: 
· The Defendants object to this Interrogatory because it is vague and ambiguous as to the 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES-I 
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meaning of "employees and/or agents" and "transactions and events which are the subject matter of 
the pleadings." Without waiving these objections, the Defendants state that, Defendant Wade 
Massey, a member of Capitol West Appraisals, LLC, is the "employee/agent" who prepared the 
appraisal that is at least in part, relevant to this lawsuit. Additionally, Shannon Polfer an independent 
contractor who handles the bookkeeping for Capitol West Appraisals, LLC was also "involved" as 
she handled receipt of the $800.00 check from Idahy and deposited it into the Capitol West 
Appraisals, LLC's bank account. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify all persons responsible for furnishing any materials 
or information used to complete these Interrogatories. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2: 
Wade Massey 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State the name, address and telephone number of all persons 
who you believe may have knowledge or relevant information concerning each claim or defense 
disclosed in the Complaint and Answer. 
ANSvVER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3: 
The Defendants identify the following individuals without limitation: 
( 1) Ethan Morris - former branch Vice President of Member Services for Idahy Credit Union 
n/k/a Icon Credit Union ("Idahy"). 
(2) Dan Barger - former mortgage loan officer for Idahy. 
(3) Connie Miller - current President and CEO of Icon Credit Union. 
( 4) Debbie Browning - Vice President of Icon Credit Union. 
(5) Steven L. Hruza and Valerie J. Hruza ("Hruzas") - borrowers on the $250,000 home 
equity loan. 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES-2 
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(6) WadeMassey-appraiserwho appraised 16462PlumAve., Caldwell, ID 83607 ("Subject 
Property"). 
(7) Shannon Polfer - as identified above. 
(8) Jacob Wilson - Former mortgage loan officer for Clearwater Mortgage 
(9) Ernie Menchaka-Former President of Clearwater Mortgage 
( 10) Diane Leigh - Senior Recovery Specialist for the Plaintiff assigned to subject claim. 
(11) AJ. Stover - Vice-President of Lending at Icon Credit Union 
(12) Individuals identified in the parties' discovery responses. See Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 33(c)(stating that it is sufficient to specify the records from which the answer to an 
interrogatory may be derived when "the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially 
the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for the party served"). 
(13) Any expert disclosed by the parties. 
Discovery is ongoing and, as a result, the parties may discover the identities of additional 
individuals who may have knowledge or relevant information about the claims and defenses 
disclosed in the Complaint and Answer. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify and list each document you believe may be relevant 
to each separate claim or defense disclosed in the Complaint and Answer. As to each of the 
documents identified, please provide the following: 
a. The location of the document(s). 
b. The name, address, and telephone number of the individual with custody or control over 
the document(s). 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4: 
The Defendants object to this InteITogatory because and to the extent it seeks information, 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES-3 
documents, or communications protected by attorney-client privilege, confidentiality, work product 
doctrines, and I.RE. 502. Without waiving these objections, the Defendants answer this 
Interrogatory as follows: because the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially 
the same for the Plaintiff as for the answering Defendants, see Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 33( c ), 
they refer the Plaintiff to the parties' discovery answers and responses, any supplements thereto and 
the pleadings or papers filed in this matter. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please explain why the Uniform Residential Appraisal Report 
prepared by Defendants appraising 16462 Plum Rd, Caldwell, ID. 83607 owned by Valerie Hruza, 
having an effective appraisal date of 6/13/2007 (the "Appraisal") uses a Neighborhood Description 
and the Neighborhood Boundaries for the city of Parma, Idaho when the Subject Property is located 
in the Neighborhood named Caldwell, Idaho. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5: 
The use of the description neighborhood boundaries for the City of Parma, Idaho on the 
appraisal form was a mistake. It was one of the corrections to be made by the Defendants on the 
appraisal prior to being advised by Clearwater Mortgage that it had no intention of utilizing the 
appraisal due to the fact that the applicants, Steven and Valerie Hruza had already been declined for 
various reasons, including insufficient credit. It is also noted that the appraisal does identify the 
Hruza property as being located in Caldwell, Idaho. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify by street number, street name, and city and state 
location the 50+ year old real property listed in the One Unit Housing column in the "Neighborhood" 
section on page I of 6 in the Appraisal which sold for the high price of $1.5 million. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6: 
This answering Defendant objects to this Interrogatory as it is misleading and unanswerable 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES-4 
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as stated. Without waiving said objection, there is no representation in the appraisal of any such sale 
referenced in Interrogatory No. 6. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Please explain why none of COMPARABLE SALE #1 
through and including COMP ARABLE SALE #6 listed in the Appraisal beginning on page 2 of 6 
and continuing on an unnumbered page represents an actual closed sale that occurred within the 12 
month period preceding June 13, 2007. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7: 
These answering Defendants object to this Interrogatory as Plaintiff misreads the appraisal 
and as such, the interrogatory is unanswerable. ·without waiving said objection, statements 
contained in Interrogatory No. 7 are incorrect. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please explain why Defendants did not use as a 
COMP ARABLE SALE any of the six closed sales mentioned on Appraisal page 1 of 6 in the 
"Neighborhood" section, which states: "In the last 6 months for homes with below grade footage 
4000-5300 sq. ft. homes in the 1292 and 1290, 0900 and 0950 MLS area, there have been 6 closed 
sales .... " 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8: 
These answering Defendants object to this Interrogatory as Plaintiff misreads the appraisal 
and as such, the interrogatory is unanswerable. Without waiving said objection, statements 
contained in Interrogatory No. 8 are incorrect. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please identify by street number, street name, city and state 
and by MLS Area number, all 6 of the comparable properties "currently offered for sale in the 
subject neighborhood ranging in price from $599,900 to $995,900" that are mentioned in the first 
line at the top of Appraisal page 2 of 6. 
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9: 
These answering Defendants object to this Interrogatory as Plaintiff misreads the appraisal 
and as such, the interrogatory is unanswerable. Without waiving said objection, these Defendants 
indicate that the properties in this section of the appraisal were incorrectly identified and were in the 
process of being edited when the report was canceled by the client, Clearwater Mortgage due to the 
fact that the Hruza application had been turned down prior to any review of said appraisal. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please identify by street number, street name, city and state, 
and by MLS Area number, all 8 of the comparable sales "in the subject neighborhood within the past 
twelve months ranging in sale price from $580,000 to $985,000" that are mentioned in the 2nct line 
down from the top of Appraisal page 2 of 6. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10: 
These answering Defendants object to this Interrogatory as Plaintiff misreads the appraisal 
and as such, the interrogatory is unanswerable. Without waiving said objection, these Defendants 
indicate that the properties in this section of the appraisal were incorrectly identified and were in the 
process of being edited when the report was canceled by the client, Clearwater Mortgage due to the 
fact that the Hruza application had been turned down prior to any review of said appraisal. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please identify all the market factors which caused the 
subject property at 16462 Plum Rd., Caldwell, ID. to increase in value from an actual sales price of 
$740,000 on 11/10/2005 to an appraised Indicated Value by Sales Comparison Approach of 
$1,150,000 as of 6/13/2007, as shown in Appraisal page 2 of 6. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11: 
These answering Defendants object to this Interrogatory as Plaintiff misreads the appraisal 
and as such, the interrogatory is unanswerable. Without waiving said objection, these answering 
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Defendants direct Plaintiff to the explanation of market factors under analysis of prior sale section, 
page 2 of 6 of the appraisal. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify the MLS Area number for the subject property at 
16462 Plum Rd., Caldwell, ID. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12: 
1290. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Identify the MLS Area number for the Neighborhood 
actually used in the Neighborhood section on Appraisal page 1 of 6. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13: 
1292. 
INTERROGATORY N0.14: Please explain why the "Opinion of Site Value" in the Cost 
Approach section on page 3 of 6 in the Appraisal values the subject property land at $86,657 ,37 per 
acre($430,000 divided by 5 .02 acres) whereas the Value Adjustments made to the "Site" component 
of COMPARABLE SALES #1, #2, #3, #4, #5 AND #6 in the Sales Comparison Approach section 
for each such COMPARABLE SALE values the COMPARABLE SALE land at only $10,000 per 
acre. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14: 
These answ~ring Defendants object to this Interrogatory as Plaintiff misreads the appraisal 
and as such, the interrogatory is unanswerable. Without waiving said objection, these answering 
Defendants base values in this section of appraisal on the contributory value of the property as 
reflected under the "cost to purchase option" on page 3 of 6 of the appraisal. Defendant otherwise 
states that the appraisal speaks for itself. 
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DATED this f day of December, 2010. 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
By: )'/~ 
Michael E. Ke,lly, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for befendant Wade Massey 
CERTJFICYE OF SERV1CE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~day of December, 2010, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
WILSON & MCCOLL 
420 W. Washington 
PO Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-9100 
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Patrick J. Collins 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
700 17th St., Suite 1820 
Denver, CO 80202 
Telephone: (303) 296-7700 
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160 

















DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES-
VERIFICATION 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Wade !V1:1ssey, after first being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that he has read the 
foregoing answers to Plaintiffs First Set ofinteITogatories and believe the same are true to the best 
of his knowledge. 
wade Massey 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this (].,l!~ay of November, 2010. 
"' 
\J(QA~~ 
Notary Public; tate of Idah9 A/7 
Residing at 1/3lll~ 14-! 
My Commission expires 2if-la-1 (d 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351 
John J. Browder, ISB #7531 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100 
PO Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701-0856 
Telephone: (208) 342-4300 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344 
2 700.024\0pposition56(f)Motion. wpd 
Attorneys for Defendants 
JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS JNSURANCE SOCIETY, JNC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVlO - 3993 
DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND 
CAPITOL WEST'S OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION TO PERMIT THE 
TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA 
DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO RULE 
56(f) AND RENEWED MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
By and through undersigned counsel, Defendants Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals 
(sometimes hereinafter "Defendants" or "Massey") file their Oppositi'on to Motion to Permit the Taking 
of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's 
Order Granting Summary Judgment ("Opposition"). 
DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO PERMIT THE TAKING 
OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO RULE 56(f) AND RENEWED MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
In its Motion to Permit the Taking of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and 
Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment ("Motion"), Cumis moves 
the Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(f) to take the deposition of Ernie Menchaca. Cumis also requests the 
Court to reconsider, for the second time, its February 16, 2012, Order granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
The Court should deny Cumis's motion in their entirety. Cumis's Response to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment was filed months ago, on January 13, 2012. At that time, Cumis did not seek relief 
under I.R.C.P. 56(f) despite the fact Massey's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed on November 10, 2011, referred to the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca fourteen times. Since then, the 
Court granted Massey's Motion for Summary Judgment and entered a Judgment on March 16, 2012. 
Therefore, seeking relief under I.R.C.P. 56(f) is untimely and unwarranted, as there is no pending motion 
for summary judgment proceeding to oppose. The renewed motion to reconsider the Court's Order 
Granting Summary Judgment is also untimely under I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B). In addition to being untimely 
in its present form, the Motion is also merely a rehashing of Plaintiffs previous arguments and presents 
no new factual evidence or novel legal basis. It is representative of the Plaintiff's continued harassment 
of the Court to accept its tortured spin on the pending action. 
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A. The Court Should Deny Cumis's Motion to Permit the Taking of Ernie Menchaca's 
Deposition. 
I.R.C.P. 56(f) permits a court to order a continuance of summary judgment proceedings "should 
it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present 
by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition .... " 'Here, Cumis already has opposed 
Massey's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court already has granted Massey's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. And the Court already has entered a final Judgment. Afortiori, there is no longer a summary 
judgment proceeding for which to seek a continuance. See I.R.C.P. 56(f). 
Even if these fatal procedural pitfalls did not exist, Cumis has failed to adequately explain why it 
did not request 56(f) r~lief when it was opposing Massey's Motion for Summary Judgment and there was 
a proceeding to continue. Assuming for the sake of the argument that both of Cumis' s attorneys did not 
receive Ernie Menchaca' s affidavit, 1 the alleged need to take Mr. Menchaca' s deposition existed with as 
much force when Cumis was preparing its opposition as it would at this time. Undeniably, Cumis knew 
or should have known that Massey could, and, in fact, was relying on Mr. Menchaca. First, Massey 
identified Ernie Menchaca as an individual with potential relevant knowledge in Defendants' December 
8, 2010 Answers to Plaintiff's First Set oflnterrogatories.2 (See Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's First 
1 As the Court has observed, stipulations in open proceedings are final. See Workman 
Fmnily Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 35, 655 P.2d 926, 929 (1982). 
2 Cumis' s counsel seemingly tries to disparage ~,.1assey' s counsel by describing the 
Menchaca affidavit as "ex parte" The argument hardly merits a response. Suffice it say, there is 
nothing improper about tracking down and interviewing potential witnesses. The concept of "ex 
parte" does not apply to such actions, and Cumis' s characterization as such is ponderous, off 
point and improper. If counsel is arguing that the Affidavit of Mr. Menchaca was filed with the 
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Set oflnterrogatories, Answer No. 3(9) attached as Exhibit A, to the Affidavit of Counsel filed in Support 
of Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion). Second, Massey's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment refers to the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca fourteen (14) times. Massey also relied on Mr. 
Menchaca' s affidavit three (3) times in its Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
one (1) time in its Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment. Similarly, Massey's 
expert, Joe Huffman, relied on it in formulating his affidavit. But despite Massey's frequent written 
reliance on Menchaca' s affidavit, none of Cumis' s multiple attorneys ever advised Massey's counsel that 
it did not receive Menchaca's Affidavit.3 Nor did Cumis at that time move the Court for relief under 
I.R.C.P. 56(f). Simply put, if Menchaca's deposition is "essential" now to justify Cumis's opposition, it 
was even more "essential" then. See I.R.C.P. 56(f). Further, Cumis has offered no plausible reason why 
it could not have deposed Menchaca sometime before Massey's summary judgment was filed, was heard, 
or before the Court entered Judgment in its favor. 
B. The Court Should Deny Cumis's Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order 
Granting Summary Judgment. 
Motions for reconsideration are governed by I.R.C.P l l(a)(2)(B), which states: 
(B) Motion For Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders 
of the District Court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not 
later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment. A motion for 
reconsideration of any order of the District Court made after entry of final judgment may 
be filed within fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order; provided, there shall be no 
Court "ex parte", it was filed with the Court Clerk immediately following argument on the 
summary judgment motions. Plaintiff's counsel was not provided a copy of the Affidavit at that 
time based on the in Court presentation by counsel that Plaintiff had received the Affidavit, and 
the Court's statement that it had not. 
3 Despite the numerous references to the Menchaca Affidavit by Massey, at no point 
during the Summary Judgment briefing stage did any of Cumis' s attorneys contact Massey's 
counsel and inquire as the whereabouts of the Menchaca Affidavit. 
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motion for reconsideration of an order of the District Court entered on any motion filed 
under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b). 
Cumis's Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's February 16, 2012, order granting Massey's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is untimely and without basis. The Court entered a final Judgment on 
March 16, 2012. A Motion for Reconsideration had to filed by within 14 days after entry of that Judgment, 
or no later than March 30, 2012. Cumis's Renewed Motion for Reconsideration was filed on April 19, 
2012, which is ten days after the Court's denial of Plaintiff's initial Motion for Reconsideration. As 
labeled, Plaintiff is simply renewing its aforementioned Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order 
Granting Summary Judgment. Plaintiff is not asking the Court to revisit its denial of Plaintiff's Motion 
for Reconsideration, dated April 9, 2012. As such, the present motion is untimely. Nevertheless, in 
neither Motion for Reconsideration has Plaintiff presented new or additional facts for the Court to consider 
nor have any novel legal arguments been advanced. Accordingly, the Court should deny the Plaintiff's 
pending renewed Motion even if deemed timely under Rule 11 (a)(2)(B).4 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Massey respectfully requests that this Court deny Plaintiff's Motion to 
Permit the Taking of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to 
Reconsider the Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment. 
4 Cumis has advanced no substantive argument that Massey has not already responded to 
multiple times. To that end, Massey incorporates by reference its previous briefing, namely its 
Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. 
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DATED this _j_· day of May, 2012. 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
y, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for t e Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this_\_ day of May, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated below, 
addressed as follows: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson Fa U.S. Mail WILSON & MCCOLL Hand-Delivered 
420 W. Washington 0 Overnight mail 
PO Box 1544 0 Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-9100 
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Patrick J. Collins @ U.S. Mail COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC Hand-Delivered 
700 17th St., Suite 1820 0 Overnight mail 
Denver, CO 80202 0 Facsimile 
Telephone: (303) 296-7700 
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO RULE 56(f) AND RENEWED MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6 
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Jeffrey M. Wilson, #1615 
Wilson & McColl 
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone: 208-345-9100 
Patrick J, CoHins, #13046 
Collins & Coldwell, LLC 
700 Sev.;;nteenth Street, Suite 1820 
Denver, CO 80202 
Telephone'. 303-296-7700 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD nJDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
MAY 0 9 2012 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
--~--------~---------.....---~-----~---~ 
CtJM1S fNSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.1 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
Case No. CVl0-3993 
WADE ~fASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
.APPRAISALS, 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS WADE MASSEY AND 
CAPITOL WEST APPRAISALS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION 
PURSUANT TO RULE 56(F) AND RENEWED MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE 
COURrs ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
NOW COlvffiS Plaintiff, by and through counsel of record, a.11d files its Reply to 
Defendants Vlade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to 
Permit t.1e Taking of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and renewed Motion to 
Reconsider the Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment. 
1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Pennit Taking of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 
56(t) ar1d Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment 
requesting that the Court order a continuance to permit the Plaintiff to depose Mr. Menchaca. 
Plaintiff now submits its Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Penn.it Taldng 
of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(t) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the 
Court's Otdtr Granting Summary Judgment ("Opposition'). 
II. ANALYSIS 
Defendants' Opposition argues that the Plaintiff cannot apply to take Mr. Menchaca's 
depositi011 because Defendants referred to the Menchaca Affidavit in their Motion for Summary 
"'"'1' .. "'"'v'''" and have relied on the Menchaca Affidavit since; including the use of the Menchaca 
Defendants' expert witness. Defendants seem to be claiming that it iS the Plain.tiffs 
for not earlier catching Defendants' failure to file the Menchaca Affidavit with the Court or 
provide a copy of the Affidavit to Plaintiffs. This argument; however, is fallacious in that it 
attempts to make Plaintiff responsible for Defendants' failures and inacti.on1• 
Defendants' continued use of and reliance upon the Menchaca Affidavit does not cure these 
failures, rafaer it highlights them as Plaintiff has never been given the opportunity to test what 
seems to be the crux of Defendants' case. Defendants' assert that they did not owe a duty to 
Idahy Credit Union (bereinafter, "Idahy FCU;;) and therefore did not violate the Uniform 
Sta.;1(.fard~ of Professional Appraisal Practice (hereinafter, "USP AP"). Defendants then attempt 
to make this assertion a fact by relying on the Menchaca Affidavit, which was never disclosed 
nor provided, after Defendants first scheduled and then vacated Mr. Menchaca's deposition. The 
Menchaca Affidavit and the affidavit of Defendants' expert, Mr. Hoffman2, clearly raise genuine 
issues of material fact by making several assertions about the scope of an appraiser's duties 
1 As1.1.i'l officer eif the Court, Defendunts' co11nsel has an affirmative duty to disclose all documentation Defendant 
intends. to rely on at triaL 
'-Defendants adi"l'lit that Mr. Hoffman relied on Mr. Merichaca's Affidavit when formulating his expert opinion. See, 
DefrmdMt's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Pennit the Taking of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 
56(f) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Coun's Order Granting Summary Judgment, p, 4. 
2 
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u.rider USPAP that are not supported by the Financial Institution Refonn and Recovery Act of 
1989 (hereinafter; "FIR.REA"), the plain language ofUSPAP Standard 2-2(b) or Defendant 
Massey's certification of the scope of Defendants' Appraisal of Real Property. In Defendant 
certification of Defendants' Appraisal of Real Property; Defendant Massey certifies 
A.ppr-a:isal is a ''Summary,, appraisal which is governed by USP AP Standard2-2(b ). As 
discusst'.d in Plaintiffs Reply to Defendants> Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
JuJgment, USP AP Standard 2-2(b) requires an appraiser to state the identity of an intended user 
by name or type (emphasis added). After certifying the Appraisal of Real Property as a 
Summary appraisal, Defendants' state in paragraph 23 of the Appraisal that, .. (t]he borrower [or] 
another lender at the request of the borrower ..• may rely on this appraisal reporf1 (emphasis 
added), 
language of I.R.C.P. 56(f) states that the Court may order a continuance to permit the 
of a deposition when "it appear[s] from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion [for 
surnmary judgment] that the party cannot for the reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition". In its Order granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and its Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, the Court notes that 
it raised ihe specific issue of Defendants' failure to file the Menchaca Affidavit. In response, 
Plaintiff :filed two affidavits of counsel stating that they never received the Menchaca 
Even if Defendants have subsequently filed the Menchaca Affidavit with the Court, 
'""'-'-'"" ... '"' h~we never had a chance to question the factual assertions made in the Menchaca 
Affidavit and in turn have never been able question the legal assertions made by Defendants' 
expert in bis affidavit. Accordingly. Plaintiff filed its Motion to Pennit Taldng of Ernie 
Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's 
Order Gi:anting Summary Judgment. 
3 See Affidavit of Patrick Collins and Affidavit of Jeffeiy Wilson, which state that neither counsel for Plaintiff ever 
received Mr. Menchaca's Affidavit. 
3 
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. r day of May, 2012. 
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Respectfully submitted> 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
WILSON & MCCOLL 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The ~dersigned hereby certifies that true and correct copies of the foregoing have been 
rhisC:/- day of May, 2012, on the following: . 
" 
Michael E. Kelly, Esq. 
~ i T ~ E jO!m "· nrower, sq. 
Lopez and Kelly, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Ste. I 00 
P.O. Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701Y08¥ • 
[ViarJ:~ 1'1"7 
~t:i. - -L/3H 
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Jeffrey M. Wilson, # 1615 
Wilson & McColl 
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone: 208-345-9100 
Patrick J. Collins, #13046 
Collins & Coldwell, LLC 
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820 
Denver, CO 80202 
Telephone: 303-296-7700 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
. • r" ~ 
F l A.~~13J P.M. --MAY 2 i 2012 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
. K CANO, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR CANYON COUNTY OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, 
Defendants-Res ondents. 
Case No. LY lO~ ?>0Ci~G 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, WADE MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, AND THE PARTIES' ATTORNEYS, LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC, P.O. BOX 
856, BOISE ID 38703 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant, CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC. (hereinafter, 
"CUMIS") appeals against the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on the 17th day of 
February, 2012, the Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on the 16th day of March, 
1 
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2012 and the Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, entered in the above entitled action 
on the 10th day of April, 2012; Honorable Judge Kerrick presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the judgment 
and orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 
I.A.R. 
3. Appellant CUMIS intends to assert in the appeal that Respondents were 
incorrectly granted their Motion for Summary Judgment and that Appellant was incorrectly 
denied its Motion for Summary Judgment and its Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's 
Order granting Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
4. Appellant requests preparation of the reporter's transcript as defined by Rule 25, 
I.A.R. in hard copy. 
5. Appellant requests that all pleadings, affidavits, exhibits and documents filed with 
the district court be included in the appellate record. 
I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Kathy Klemetson, 1115 Caldwell, ID 83605. 
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the reporter's transcript. 
( c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 




DATED this 21st day of May, 2012. 
WILSON & MCCOLL 
DATED this 21st day of May, 2012. 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE 
OF APPEAL has been transmitted via U.S.P.S, postage pre-paid, and fax service this 21st day 
of May, 2012, to the following: 
Michael E. Kelly 
John J. Browder 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
P.O. Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 342-4344 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE 
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JeffreyM. Wtlson; #1615 
Christopher R. Moore, #8772 
Wilson & McColl 
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200 · 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone: 208-345-9100 
Patrick J. Collins, #13046 
Collins & Coldwell, LLC 
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820 
Denver; CO 80202 
Telephone: 303-296-7700 
Attorneys for Plaintiff7Appellant 
No. L~4L ~. 119 
1N TIIB DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR CANYON COUNTY OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CUMIS INSURA.~CE SOCIETY, INC') 
P Jajntiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, 
Defendants/Res ondents. 
Case No. CV 2010 3993C 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
~-. -~-~----0---------'-------------~ 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: TIIB ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS" WADE MASSEY AND. CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS. AND THE PARTIES1 ATTORNEYS, LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC, AND THE 
CLERK OF TIIB ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Tne above named Appellant,, CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., appeals 
against the above named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order on Motions 
for Summary Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on the 17th day of February, 2012, 
1 
Jun, lb, LUIL L:()~rM No. LJ4L P. 2/9 
the Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on the 16th day of March, 2012, the Order on 
PlaLntiff s Motion for Reconsideration, entered in the above entitled action on the l 0th day of 
Aprili 2012; and the Court's Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Permit the Taking of Ernie Menchaca· 
Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(£) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order 
Granting Summary Judgment, entered by the Court on May 10, 2012; Honorable Judge Kerrick 
presiding. 
· 2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals and the 
judgm.ent described in paragraph I above is an a.ppealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11 
lAR. 
3. Appellant intends to assert in the appeal th.at Respondents were incorrectly 
granted their Motion for Summary Judgment and that Appellant was incorrectly denied its 
Motion for Summary Judgment and its Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Febru.azy 16, 
2012 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff's Motion to Penn.it the Talcing of 
Ernie Menchaca. Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(£) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the 
Court;s Order Granting Summary Judgment. 
4. No Order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the Record. 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(b) The Appellant requests preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter~s transcript in hard copy and electronic format: 
I. Hearing upon Plaintiff's Motion for Swnmazy Judgment and · 
3 
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Reconsider the Court's Order Granting Sununary Judgment held May 10, 
2012. 
6. (a) The Appellant's request the following doci.J.ments be included in the 
I certify: 
Clerk's record in addition to the autoi;iiatically included under I.A.R. 28: 
1. All Pleadings/ Affidavits/Exhibits with respect to Appellant's and 
Respondent's Motions for Summary Judgment heard on February 9, 
2012; 
2. All Pleadings/Affidavits/Exhibits with respect to Appellant's 
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's February 16, 2012 Order on 
· Motions for Summary Judgment, and Respondent's response to the same; 
all.d 
3. All Pleadings/Affidavits/Exhibits with respect to Appellant's 
Motion to Pennit the Taking of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to 
Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order Granting 
Summa..ry- Judgment, and Respondent's response to the same heard on 
May 10, 2012, 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Kathy Klemetson, 1115 Albany, Caldwell, Idaho 83605. 
Laura Whiting, 1115 Albany, Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the re-porter:1s transcript. 
3 
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( c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
( d) That the. appellate filing fee has been paid. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20, I.A.R. 
DATED this /.f; day of June, 2012. 
WILSON & McCOLL 
DA TED this / {offtday of June, 2012. 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREi3Y CERTIFY that on the J ~day of June, 2012, I mailed and faxed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL by regular United States mail 
with t11e correct postage affixed thereon addressed to: 
Canyon County Courthouse 
Kathy Klemetson 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Facsimile: 208-454-7 442 
Canyon County Courthouse 
Laura Whiting 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Facsimile: 208-454-7442 
John J. Browder 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100 
PO Box 856 
· Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: 208-342-4344 
Patrick J. Collins 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
700 Seventeenth Street; Suite 1820 




Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351 
John J. Browder, ISB #7531 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100 
PO Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701-0856 
Telephone: (208) 342-4300 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344 
2700.024\Supp.Judgment.wpd 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVlO - 3993 
SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Judgment, entered on 
March 16, 2012 is hereby amended, such that Defendants WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS shall recover against the Plaintiffs, costs as a matter of right totaling $817.61 
pursuant to the Order of the Court at the hearing on May 10, 2012. 
~;')--P--------
DATED th~day of June, 2012. 
SUPPLEMENT AL JUDGMENT- I 
31.9 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this cl\ day of June, 2012, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated 
below, addressed as follows: 
Michael E. Kelly 
John J. Browder 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100 
PO Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-4300 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
WILSON & MCCOLL 
420 W. Washington 
PO Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-9100 
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Patrick J. Collins 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
700 17th St., Suite 1820 
Denver, CO 80202 
Telephone: (303) 296-7700 
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160 
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ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
AND FEES 




On February 17, 2012, this court entered its Order on Motions for Summary Judgment in 
this case, granting Defendants summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims against them. 
Judgment on the court's February 17, 2012 Order was entered on March 16, 2012. 
On March 22, 2012, Defendants filed their Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees seeking 
$817.61 costs as a matter of right and $28,545.00 in attorney fees, pursuant to Idaho Code 
section 12-120(3), through February 29, 2012. 
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Plaintiff filed its Response to Defendants' Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees, together 
with a Notice of Hearing, on April 4, 2012. 
I. Prevailing Party 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l), in order to recover costs and attorney fees in this action, 
Defendants must establish that they are the prevailing party. 
A trial court's determination regarding whether a party prevailed in an action is a matter 
of discretion. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B); Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 210 P.3d 552, 555 (2009). 
In making a determination, the court properly exercises its discretion if it: (1) correctly 
perceives the issue as one of discretion; (2) acts within the outer boundaries of that discretion 
and consistently with the applicable legal standards; and (3) reaches its determination by an 
exercise of reason. Id. 
Plaintiff apparently contends that Defendants are not the prevailing party in this action 
because: "I. The Court's Order Makes Factual Findings that are in Dispute or Not Supported by 
the Evidence." The court finds that this not a proper ground to object to an award of costs and 
fees and the matter has already been addressed in the court's Order on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration. In light of the court's determination in the February 17, 2012 Order on 
Motions for Summary Judgment, the court determines that Defendants are the prevailing party 
in this action. 
II. Costs 
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Defendants seek an award of costs as a matter of right, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(C) 
in the amount of $817 .61. 1 
Plaintiff has not specifically challenged the amount or Defendants' entitlement to such 
amount, other than the continued assertion that the court erred in its determination on summary 
judgment. Accordingly, the court determines that Defendants are entitled to an award of costs 
in the amount of $817 .61. 
III. Attorney Fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3) 
Defendants seek $28,545.00 in attorney fees through February 29, 2012, including 
paralegal fees, pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3). 
A. Statutory Authority for an Award of Attorney Fees 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) authorizes the court, in any civil action, to award reasonable attorney 
fees to the prevailing party when provided for by any statute or contract. Idaho Code Section 
12-120(3) requires the court to allow a reasonable attorney fee to the prevailing party in a civil 
action based upon a commercial transaction, unless otherwise provided by law. The term 
"commercial transaction" is defined in the statute as "all transactions except transactions for 
personal or household purposes." 
The issue of whether an action is based on commercial transaction, for purposes of an 
award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3), is a question oflaw. Great 
Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 470 (2001). 
1 In their original papers, Defendants requested an award of costs in the amount of$875.72 and the court used this 
figure in making its determination on the record on May 10, 2012. However, Defendants subsequently submitted a 
Supplemental Judgment reflecting costs in the amount of $817 .61. The court has used that figure in this Order in 
order to avoid any discrepancy between this Order and the Supplemental Judgment. 
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In determining whether a prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to section 12-120(3 ), the court must engage in a two-stage analysis: (1) there must be 
a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim; and (2) the commercial transaction must 
be the basis upon which recovery is sought. Id. at 471. 
1. Commercial Transaction Integral to the Claim 
In determining whether there is a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim, the 
critical test is whether the commercial transaction constitutes the gravamen of the lawsuit. Id. 
The commercial transaction must be an actual basis of the complaint, that is, the lawsuit and the 
causes of action must be based on a commercial transaction, not simply a situation that can be 
characterized as a commercial transaction. Id. 
The issue is whether there was a transaction between the parties to which section 12-
120(3) would properly apply. Id. at 472. Section 12-120(3) "cannot be invoked ifthe 
commercial transaction is between parties only indirectly related, i.e. there was no transaction 
between the parties." Id. (citing Hausum v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569 (Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis 
in original). 
Defendar.ts rely on a line of cases, including Miller v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Ctr., Inc., which stand for the proposition that "if a party asserts a claim that is based upon the 
existence of an alleged commercial transaction, attorney fees are awardable to a prevailing party 
who defends against such claim even if the alleged commercial transaction is found not to have 
existed. In that circumstance, attorney fees are awardable under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) even if 
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there were other theories also asserted in support of the claim that would not have triggered 
application of the statute." 139 Idaho 825, 839 (2004) (citing Great Plains). 
However, Miller is distinguishable from the instant case in that the plaintiff in that case 
apparently actually alleged facts sufficient to establish, prima facie, a transaction between 
himself and the defendant: 
In his second amended complaint, Dr. Miller alleged as one count that his application for 
medical staff privileges created a contract between him and the Hospital and that the Hospital 
breached that contract. The focus of the trial was whether the Hospital acted in good faith in the 
performance of its alleged contractual allegations. Id The court determined that "Dr. Miller's 
allegation of a contract between him and the Hospital that was for other than personal or 
household purposes constituted the allegation of a commercial transaction. Id. The Court 
reiterated, however, "that a transaction cannot exist under the statute unless the parties dealt 
with each other directly." Id 
Here, while Plaintiff did assert a claim for breach of contract, that claim was not based 
on a transaction in which the parties dealt with one another directly. Instead, as Defendants 
asserted on their Motion for Summary Judgment and the court determined in its Order on 
Motions for Summary Judgment, the allegations of the complaint made out a claim for 
negligence only, as a matter oflaw. 
IV. Attorney Fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121 
On May 1, 2012, Defendants filed a Reply and Reply Affidavit adding a claim for an 
award of fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS AND FEES 
- 5 -
0325 
The court finds that Defendants' request for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code section 12-121 is not properly before it for two reasons. First, the applicable provisions of 
the I.R.C.P. do not provide for a reply in response to an objection to costs and fees. See I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(5), 54(d)(6), and 54(e)(l). Second, pursuant to Rule 54(d)(5), a memorandum of costs 
must be filed within fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment and "[F]ailure to file such 
memorandum of costs within the period prescribed by this rule shall be a waiver of the right of 
costs." In light ofthis requirement, the court finds that Defendants waived their right to a claim 
for attorney fees pursuant to section 12-121 by failing to file their memorandum requesting an 
award of fees under section 12-121 within fourteen (14) days after the entry of the Judgment. 
However, as the court noted at the hearing on Plaintiff's objection, it does not find an 
award of fees pursuant section 12-121 appropriate on the facts of this case. 
I.R.C.P. 54( e )(1) authorizes the court, in any civil action, to award reasonable attorney fees to 
the prevailing party when provided for by any statute or contract. 
Idaho Code Section 12-121 authorizes the court, in any civil action, to award reasonable 
attorney fees to the prevailing party. However, pursuant to IRCP 54( e )(1 ), the court may award 
attorney fees against a defendant under Section 12-121 only when it finds, from the facts 
presented to it, that the case was defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. 
Therefore, an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 is not a matter of 
right. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District v. Washington Federal Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 
524, 20 P.3d 702, 708 (2001). Instead, an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 12-121 is 
within the discretion of the trial court, but only when the court "is left with the abiding belief 
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that the action was ... defended ... frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Id. If 
there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, the court may not award attorney fees under section 
12-121, even if the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation. Id. 135 Idaho at 524-525, 20 P.3d at 708-709. A claim is 
not necessarily frivolous simply because the district court concludes it fails as a matter of law. 
Garner, 259 P.3d at 614. A misperception of the law or of one's interest under the law is not, 
by itself, unreasonable. Id. (quoting Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 P.2d 262, 265 
(Ct. App. 1997)). Rather, the question is whether the position adopted was not only incorrect, 
but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation." Id. 
While the court dismissed Plaintiffs breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation 
claims as improper under Idaho law, the court finds that such claims were merely alternative 
means of alleging that Defendants violated a duty to Plaintiff on the facts alleged. The court 
subsequently granted summary judgment to Defendants dismissing Plaintiffs negligence claim 
based upon insufficient evidence, in the record before the court, to support the existence of a 
duty, recognized by law, running from Defendants to Plaintiff. The court cannot conclude that 
Plaintiffs position, that Defendants had a legal duty to Plaintiff, was so plainly fallacious that it 
could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. 
ORDER 
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Based on the foregoing, Defendants are awarded costs as a matter of right in the amount 
of $817.61; and Plaintiff's objection to Defendants' Motion for an award of attorney fees is 
GRANTED, and Defendants' request for an award of attorney fees is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
-!<----
Dated this~ day of June, 2012. 
~-(!,~'~ 
Juneal C. Kerrick 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the 
following, either by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid; by personal service; by courthouse 
basket; or by facsimile copy: 
John J. Browder 
Lopez & Kelly, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100 
P.O. Box 856 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: 208-342-4344 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson & McColl 
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200 
Boise, Idaho 83 703 
Facsimile: 208-384-0442 
Patrick J. Collins 
Collins & Coldwell, LLC 
700 17th Street, Suite 1820 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
Facsimile: 303-295-7160 
Dated this A \ day of June, 2012. 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO 
Clerk of the Court 
By:~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 












ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
SECOND MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 





In this action, Plaintiff asserts claims for professional negligence, negligent 
misrepresentation, and breach of contract based upon Defendant's alleged negligence in 
preparing an appraisal on certain real property located in Canyon County. Plaintiff alleges that 
Idahy Federal Credit Union, now known as Icon Credit Union, relied on the appraisal in 
approving a loan to Steven and Valerie Hruza secured by a second mortgage on the property. 
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The factual allegations of the Complaint are set forth in the court's February 17, 2012 
Order on Motions for Summary Judgment. In that Order, the court granted Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims for Negligent Misrepresentation and 
Breach of Contract, based on the determination that such claims were not viable, as a matter of 
law, based upon existing Idaho precedent and the facts alleged, and Plaintiffs Negligence 
claim, based upon the absence of a duty, recognized by law, running from Defendants to 
Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 1, 2012. 
On April 10, 2012, the court entered its Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, 
determining that it did not require oral argument on the Motion and adhering to its 
determination in the February 17, 2012 Order. 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
On April 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed its "Motion to Permit the Taking of Ernie Menchaca 
Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(£) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order 
Granting Summary Judgment" requesting "that the Court stay the Judgment in this case, permit 
the deposition of Ernie Menchaca, and reconsider and vacate its Order granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and allow this Plaintiff to proceed to trial, allowing a jury to 
determine whether Massey is liable for his admittedly 'defective' Appraisal." 
I. Legal Standards 
There is no provision in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to "renew" a motion for 
reconsideration that has already been determined on the merits. 
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Pursuant to IRCP 11 (a)(2)(B), a "motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders 
of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later than 
fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment." Judgment on the court's February 17, 
2012 Order was entered on March 16, 2012. Plaintiff filed the instant Motion on April 19, 
2012, more than fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment. Accordingly, to the extent 
Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the court's February 17, 2012 Order on this Motion, the 
motion is not timely. The record before the court on the instant motion indicates that it is 
addressed to the court's February 17, 2012 Order, for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiff seeks 
relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(£), which would be available only in relation to Defendants' 
original Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) Plaintiff seeks to "renew" its Motion for 
Reconsideration, which was addressed to the court's February 17 Order; (3) Plaintiff contends, 
on this Motion, that the court erred in granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; and 
(4) in its April 10, 2012 Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, the court merely 
adhered to its determination in the February 17, 2012 Order - Plaintiff did not rely on any 
additional facts in support of its Motion for Reconsideration and did not adduce any new or 
different legal authority in support of its Motion for Reconsideration. 
II. I.R.C.P. 56(f) Relief 
Plaintiff also seeks an order permitting Plaintiff to take "the deposition of Ernie 
Menchaca pursuant to Rule 56(f)." 
I.R.C.P. 56(f) authorizes the court to "refuse the application for judgment or order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
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for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition." 
Rule 56(f) does not authorize a motion to be made after summary judgment has been 
granted and Plaintiff has adduced no authority for the proposition that a Rule 56(f) motion is 
properly interposed after an order has been entered on a motion for summary judgment. 
In addition, the affidavits adduced in support of the instant motion do not state facts 
sufficient for the court to conclude that Plaintiff "cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit 
facts essential to justify" its opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Finally, and most troubling to the court, the affidavits filed by Plaintiff in support of the 
instant Motion are inherently contradictory. The Affidavit of Plaintiff's local counsel 
acknowledges that counsel agreed to the court's consideration of the Menchaca Affidavit in 
determining the parties' motions for summary judgment, stating that such agreement was based 
on a mistaken belief that Plaintiff had, in fact, received a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit prior 
to the hearing. However, at the same time, in Paragraph Five of the instant Motion, Plaintiff 
states, "[T]he Court's Order is incorrect in the statement that counsel at the hearing 
"acknowledge receipt of the Menchaca Affidavit." In addition, the Affidavit of Plaintiff's pro 
hac vice counsel in support of the instant Motion states, in Paragraph Six, "[P]laintiff s counsel 
disagrees with the Court's assertion in its Order granting Defendant's request for summary 
judgment which stated, 'At the hearing, the Court confirmed that Plaintiff had timely received a 
copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with the original Motion papers .... "i In light of this 
contradiction in Plaintiff's own evidence, there is no basis for the court to conclude that 
1 Counsel has not adduced a transcript of the hearing, or other evidence, in support of this contention. 
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Plaintiff, at the time of the original Motion for Consideration, could not present facts essential to 
justify Plaintiffs opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants asserted that they assumed no duty 
to Plaintiff (Idahy) in preparing the appraisal at issue. The record contains the following 
evidence: (1) In its deposition, Plaintiff stated it did not know how it came into possession of 
the appraisal; and (2) Mr. Menchaca stated that industry custom requires an assignment when a 
second lender wishes to use an appraisal commissioned by a prior lender and Clearwater 
Mortgage did not assign the appraisal to Idahy. Plaintiff has not explained, in its papers on the 
instant Motion, why it cannot or could not present facts contradicting this evidence. 
III. Conclusion 
In concluding that Plaintiff has not demonstrated entitlement to relief on this motion, the 
court is not determining that Plaintiff has no procedural basis for relief in this action. The court 
is also cognizant of the well-established policy in the courts of this state that actions should 
proceed on the merits rather than being resolved on a technicality. See Hayward v. Valley Vista 
Care Corporation, 136 Idaho 342, 349, 33 P.3d 816, 823 (2001). The court has simply 
determined that the instant Motion to Renew and for relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(f) is not a 
proper vehicle, even under a liberal construction of the rules. The court notes that Plaintiff has 
not sought relief from the Judgment entered in this case or from the court's February 17, 2012 
Order pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b) and, therefore, the court has not had occasion to make a 
determination under that Rule or any other applicable rule of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 




Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion to Permit the Taking of Ernie Menchaca 
Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order 
Granting Summary Judgment are DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
P-
Dated thi00 day of June, 2012. 
./1--;:~_J-~ ~·~~ 
/ ~l C. Kerrick 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the 
following, either by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid; by personal service; by courthouse 
basket; or by facsimile copy: 
John J. Browder 
Lopez & Kelly, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100 
P.O. Box 856 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: 208-342-4344 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson & McColl 
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200 
Boise, Idaho 83 703 
Facsimile: 208-384-0442 
Patrick J. Collins 
Collins & Coldwell, LLC 
700 17th Street, Suite 1820 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
Facsimile: 303-295-7160 
Dated this __ o_c_l __ day of June, 2012. 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO 
Clerk of the Court 
By:~ --+--------------
Deputy Clerk 




Jeffrey M. Wilson, #1615 
Christopher R. Moore, #8772 
Wilson & McColl 
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone: 208-345-9100 
Patrick J. Collins, #13046 
Collins & Coldwellj LLC 
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820 
Denver, CO 80202 
Telephone: 303-296-7700 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR CANYON COUNTY OF TIIE STATE OF IDAHO 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS, 
Defendants/Res ondents. 
Case No. CV 2010 3993C 
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: TIIE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, WADE MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST 
APPRAISALS1 AND THE PARTIES' AITORNEYS, LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: . 
NOTICE rs HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Th~ :tbove named Appellant) CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.> appeals 
against the above named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order on Motions 
fo:t Swn.rnary Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on the 17th day of February, 2012, 
l 
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the Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on the 16th day of March, 2012, the Order on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, entered in the above entitled action on the 10th day of 
April; 2012, the Court's Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Pennit the Talcing of Ernie Menchaca 
Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order 
Granting Summary Judgment, entered orally by the Court on May 10, 2012; and the Order on 
Plaintiff's Second Motion for Reconsideration, entered by the Court on June 21. 2012; 
Honorable Judge Kerrick presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals and the 
judgment described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11 
I.AR. 
3. Appellant intends to assert in the appeal that Respondents were incorrectly 
granted their Motion for Summai-y Judgment and that Appellant was incorrectly denied its 
Motion for Summary Judgment and its Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's February 16, 
2012 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment~ and Plaintiffs Motion to Permit the Taking of 
Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(t) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the 
Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment. 
4. No Order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the Record. 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(b) The Appellant requests preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript in hard copy and electronic format: 
1. Hearing upon Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Defendanfs Motion for Summary Judgment held February 9, 2012; and 
2 
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2. Hearing upon Plaintiffs Motion to Pennit the Taking of Ernie 
Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to 
Reconsider the Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment held May 10, 
2012. 
6. (a) The Appellant's request the following documents be included in the 
Clerk's record in addition to the automatically included under I.A.R. 28: 
l . All Pleadings/ Affidavits/Exhibits with respect to Appellant's and 
Respondent's Motions for Summary Judgment heard on February 9, 2012; 
2. All Pleadings/Affidavits/Exhibits with respect to Appellant's 
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's February 16, 2012 Order on 
Motions for Summary Judgment, and Respondenf s response to the same; 
and 
3. All Pleadings/Affidavits/Exhibits with respect to Appellant's 
Motion to Pennit the Tal<lng of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to 
Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order Granting 
Summary Judgment, and Respondent's response to the same heard on 
May 10, 2012. 
4. The Court's Order on Motion for Summary Judgment entered 
Februarv 17. '.'-01?.. 
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I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Kathy Klemetson; 1115 Albany, Caldwell, Idaho 83605. 
Laura Whiting, 1115 Albany, Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the reporter's transcript. 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20, I.A.R. 
DATED this _j/__ day of July, 2012. 
WILSON & McCOLL 
4 
DATED this _&..a.ay of July, 2012. 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /b day of July, 2012, I mailed and faxed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDEDNoTICE OF APPEAL by regular United States mail 
with the correct postage affixed thereon addressed to: · 
Canyon County Courthouse 
Kathy Klemetson 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Facsimile: 208-454-7 442 
Canyon County Courthouse 
Laura Whiting 
I 115 Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Facsimile: 208454-7442 
John J. Browder 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100 
PO Box 856 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: 208-342-4344 
Patrick J. Collins 
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC 
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
Facsimile: 303-295-7160 
5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Case No. CV-10-03993*C 
) 
-vs- ) CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
) 




I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following 
is being sent as an exhibit: 
NONE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
~ii""'-'"~i the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-













Case No. CV-10-03993*C 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, including documents requested. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
CHRISY AMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
m the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Supreme Court No. 40002-2012 
) 
-vs- ) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
) 




I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to the attorney of record to each 
party as follows: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson and Christopher R. Moore 
Michael E. Kelly and John J. Browder 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
U.HYL.c'-"' ... the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
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